Abstract
The mind body issue is currently being reassessed after the finding of a loophole in causal closure (Gamper in Philosophia 45:631–636, 2017). This paper is an overview of the extended field of research that has followed from it, a field labelled ‘scientific ontology’ (Gamper in Axiomathes, Forthcoming, 2018). The loophole in causal closure made the possibility of interfaces between universes consistent with the principle of causal closure. This fact gave reason to more closely investigate what ontologies could accommodate interfaces between universes. Five interesting present and future facets of scientific ontology are highlighted: an ontologically neutral concept of object, the notion of ‘causal objects’, the possibility of actual interfaces, substance dualism, and the notion of ‘the extended interface’.
1 Introduction
Scientific ontology is a new branch of science defined and discussed in the work of the Finnish-Swedish philosopher and psychologist Johan Gamper (2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). It is defined as an intermediate layer of research between the layers of, on the one side, the basic assumptions, or, basic principles, of science, and, on the other side, science in itself. This layer of research was exposed as a consequence of Gamper’s (2017) redefinition of one of the cornerstones of science, the principle of the causal closure of the physical.
In sum, the principle of the causal closure of the physical states that our physical world neither is affected by nor is affecting any other world, be that world e.g. mental or divine. The principle is so deeply embedded into our scientific culture that even Sigmund Freud, the inventor of the concept of ‘psychic energy’, sought to base his theory on biological-medical ground.
What Gamper (ibid.) found, however, was that it was possible to scrutinise the traditional definition of the principle and actually alter it to better meet up to the number of problems it eventually had been confronted with. These problems may seem affordable compared to giving up on the very principle but Gamper showed that it was possible to have the best of both worlds.
2 Causal closure
Two major difficulties for the principle as it has been defined traditionally have to do with a first cause of a universe and relations between universes. A first cause of a universe is hard to imagine if itself must have a cause that also comes from that very universe. Concerning relations between universes, also, we see that the traditional definition of causal closure forbids both a universe to cause anything outside itself and anything in a universe to be caused by something outside itself.
In Gamper’s definition the conjunction of restrictions on both causes and effects is replaced by the singular restriction on the causes. In a multiverse scenario it is sufficient to forbid causes coming in from another universe and cause anything in a particular universe. Used as a general principle for all universes this definition saves any universe from being affected (directly) by any other universe.
3 Interfaces between universes
If anything in a universe is forbidden from being caused by something from another universe, however, a loophole emerges insofar that we can imagine a cause causing something else than a universe and in the next step let this ‘something else’ cause a universe. This ‘middleman’ is conceptualised as an ‘interface’.
Given any universe (we of course have not cracked the problem of accounting for a first universe) we are with the updated definition of causal closure in position to see how that universe can generate an adjoining universe via an interface without violating the general principle of causal closure. Accordingly the updated definition both can accommodate a first cause of a universe and causal relations between universes.
4 Scientific ontology
Comparing the modal properties of the traditional definition of causal closure with the modal properties of the updated version we see that interfaces are impossible according to the traditional definition whereas they are possible according to the other definition. This shows that what is scientifically possible also has changed.
The new layer for research that has opened up, consequently, calls for investigations into how to account for the ontology that science rests upon. Science, in this context, operates with what exists. What exist, however, must be settled beforehand. This ontological plurality, however, was not scientifically interesting as long as interfaces between universes were ontologically impossible.
In short scientific ontology is research into what, if any, ontologies can accommodate interfaces between universes. Any ontology, furthermore, that can accommodate interfaces between universes, has two characteristics. First, an ontology that can accommodate interfaces between universes has descriptions of the interior of an interface as well as descriptions of the interior of a universe. Second, it has descriptions of the relations between interfaces and universes.
When we in due course reflect upon what sciences are consistent with a suggested ontology, and find one, we must leave it up to that very science to determine how to account for the observations.
Of course for this field of investigation only the sky is the limit. Gamper’s work in this regard has mainly focused efforts to direct the research. Special attention has been given to an ontologically neutral concept of the scientific object. I conclude with five interesting present and future facets of scientific ontology.
4.1 A neutral concept of object
In ‘On the Kind “Object”’ (2018b) Gamper notes that if there is at least one interface between universes there are more than one category of ontologically different types of objects. He suggests that different types of ontological objects all belong to the ‘kind’ object. This in line with that dog and cats all at ‘animals’. The challenge, therefore, is not to determine what e.g. a physical object is but to determine what any object is. In this way scientific ontology aims at establishing an ontologically neutral concept of object.
One interesting thing about this construct is that any object would have a property that the ontologically neutral object has. This, of course, means that there are properties that all objects share.
4.2 Causal objects
A possible candidate for being an ontologically neutral scientific object is what Gamper (2018b) calls ‘causal’ objects. Causal objects are technically defined but the basic idea is that objects are composed by parts that have a common causal background. If we stay with this picture we see that ‘common causal background’ seems neutral enough. It is a bit assertive, though, since it excludes non caused parts from being scientifically interesting.
A main value with the concept, though, is that it neatly divides all objects into separate classes. By this standard we have a notion that is both neutral and capable of separating the one ontological category of objects from the other.
4.3 The possibility of actual interfaces
With the loophole definition of causal closure interfaces between universes are consistent with the principle of causal closure of any universe. Therefore we can meaningfully search for an ontology that accommodates interfaces with the principle of causal closure intact.
In this context we strive for an ontology in order to investigate if interfaces are possible or impossible. This task is defined regarding one ontology at the time. If we find an ontology that permits interfaces the next step is to determine if there is any actual interface. And that is up to science to decide.
In addition to these three last points I want to in a few words open up for two new fields that are relevant in relation to the new possibilities that the new definition of causal closure entails.
4.4 Substance dualism
If we take the possibility of an interface seriously we should contemplate that an interface implies substance dualism. Substance dualism, however, projected upon the mind body relation, entails that the mind is constituted by something fundamentally non physical.
This may seem exiting but the truth is that an interface between mind and body implicates that we need to conceptualise a new psychology that stands on its own feet. This observation, notably, leads over to the last point
4.5 The extended interface
An actual interface would put pressure on the question in what context an interface can arise. If we look at a concrete example, the eventuality of an interface between mind and body, this means to ask what causal system immediately precedes the interface between mind and body.
The old saying that the mind either is physical or non physical suggests that the preceding causal system is physical. Accordingly, the mind could arise in a physical system.
This argumentation, however, is not interesting but self evident (and begging the question). It is like asking what biological events are dependent upon genetical factors (all biological events are dependent upon genetical factors). Likewise all physical events, in this case all physical causes, are dependent upon a physical system.
The preceding system must be physical (since the body is physical). The question is if a mind can emerge in any physical system. I will not discuss this further generally but focus if a mind body interface can arise in any physical system. Specifically, this means to ask if a mind body interface necessarily is preceded by a chemical system. If we answer ‘yes’ to this question, we rule out the possibility that a mind body interface can arise in any physical system (notably, we also rule out that a mind body interface can arise in a non chemical electronic system).
More importantly, however, we should ask ourselves if a mind body interface only can arise in a biological system. This, nota bene, is not to say that a mind body interface can arise only in a chemically based system. This is because we do not know the basic principle behind a biological system. We know, for instance, that a biological system can reproduce itself but we do not know what a biological system is. If we say that it is based on carbon et cetera, of course it is chemically based. My point here is that if we let the mind be sprung from the biological organism we need to know what the biological organism is. Just as we saw above that we need to know what a psychology is, in its own right. Even if a mind body interface can arise in a non chemical system it must be based in a system that in its character is biological. In nature, therefore, if we say that a mind body interface is the product of the body, we need to know what distinguishes biological systems from non biological ones. Accordingly, the extended interface, relating to its cause, has to do with what is exclusively biological and not exclusive physical or chemical.
References
Gamper, J. (2017) ‘On a Loophole in Causal Closure’, Philosophia, 45/2: 631–36.
Gamper, J. (2018a), ‘Blocking the Vagueness Block – A New Restricted Answer to the Special Composition Question’, Philosophia, Forthcoming.
Gamper, J. (2018b). The Kind ‘Object’, ‘Philosophia’, Forthcoming.
Gamper, J. (2018c) ‘Scientific Ontology’, Axiomathes, Forthcoming.
