Sorry for mixing up am/pm. It’s pm today.
Johan Gamper is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.
Topic: Open Mindfulnesses meditation on Mem
Time: Nov 29, 2022 01:30 PM Stockholm
Meeting ID: 850 6207 3820
For those not acquainted with my work I’m Johan Gamper, a clinical psychologist and an independent ontologist. I solved the mind body problem conceptually in (2017) and meta theoretically in (2021). In a conference paper from 2021 I showed how science and theology can start on the same page. That got me on the track for the necessarily instantiated concept “Mem”. I find the concept disturbing, though, so I try to come to terms with it via mindfulness meditation. I invite to open sessions on Zoom as often as I can. The structure is a short (10 min) introduction to mindfulness meditation and then four guided meditations (5 min each) on presence, reflections, wants, and plans.
On the Existence of Mem
We define a set of things of one singular kind as the set of all things that can causally affect one another. To enable causal interaction between such sets we define a thing that is of a non-singular kind as consisting of more than one singular kind. Such a thing of a non-singular kind supervenes on things of singular kinds and is open to causally intervene between sets of things of different singular kinds without violating the definition of a set of things of one singular kind. With the empty set as a set of things of one singular kind we define Mem as ‘either the smallest element of intervening sets in the indefinite set of sets of things of a singular kind and the intermediate supervening sets, or, if nothing exists, the empty set’. Thus, Mem exists. Comment. The argument focuses a definition of a supervening set of things of a non-singular kind. Besides that, it really only claims that if we define Mem as some set of existing things or the set without elements, Mem exists. That, though, is tautological. The argument, thus, can only be interesting if anything besides the empty set exists. That only the empty set would exist, however, is refuted by this very claim. (Gamper 2022)
The concept of “Mem” is a new layer in my version of Scientific Ontology (2019) where I discuss an implication of my redefinition of causal closure (2017). The redefinition allows causal interaction between separate ontological domains via interfaces (or, ontologically heterogeneous domains). “Mem” is defined as the first ontologically intermediate domain. Given the general definition of an interface the first interface has a form whereas the content must be accounted for. If there are any interfaces at all, however, is another question. Accordingly, I have showed that there can be a first cause but have not showed that there is one.
With the introduction of the concept of Mem, however, I do argue that there is a first cause. The argument is as strong as the claim that there are imaginary numbers. Practically, thus, Mem and other potential interfaces could be valued depending on their usefulness. Since the concept of interfaces is a modal account of a first cause, however, the argument that there cannot be a first cause (argument from monism), is no longer valid.
Structure of the meeting
– Introduction (10 min)
– Silence/present time (5 min)
– Reflections/past time (5 min)
– What do I want?/future time (5 min)
– Planning (5 min)
MSc Psychology, BA Philosophy (Master thesis )
Independent scholar of philosophy of mind and science, ontologist, clinical psychologist,
Gamper, J. On a Loophole in Causal Closure. Philosophia 45, 631–636 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9791-y
Gamper, J. Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject. Axiomathes 31, 497–506 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09494-8