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Open Mindfulness meditation on Mem

Sorry for mixing up am/pm. It’s pm today.

Johan Gamper is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.

Topic: Open Mindfulnesses meditation on Mem
Time: Nov 29, 2022 01:30 PM Stockholm

Join Zoom Meeting
https://us05web.zoom.us/j/85062073820?pwd=NzJCR1N6SzBxYTFmOEU3KzN1N2lsUT09

Meeting ID: 850 6207 3820
Passcode: 8RYd2x

For those not acquainted with my work I’m Johan Gamper, a clinical psychologist and an independent ontologist. I solved the mind body problem conceptually in (2017) and meta theoretically in (2021). In a conference paper from 2021 I showed how science and theology can start on the same page. That got me on the track for the necessarily instantiated concept “Mem”. I find the concept disturbing, though, so I try to come to terms with it via mindfulness meditation. I invite to open sessions on Zoom as often as I can. The structure is a short (10 min) introduction to mindfulness meditation and then four guided meditations (5 min each) on presence, reflections, wants, and plans.

On the Existence of Mem

Abstract

We define a set of things of one singular kind as the set of all things that can causally affect one another. To enable causal interaction between such sets we define a thing that is of a non-singular kind as consisting of more than one singular kind. Such a thing of a non-singular kind supervenes on things of singular kinds and is open to causally intervene between sets of things of different singular kinds without violating the definition of a set of things of one singular kind. With the empty set as a set of things of one singular kind we define Mem as ‘either the smallest element of intervening sets in the indefinite set of sets of things of a singular kind and the intermediate supervening sets, or, if nothing exists, the empty set’. Thus, Mem exists. Comment. The argument focuses a definition of a supervening set of things of a non-singular kind. Besides that, it really only claims that if we define Mem as some set of existing things or the set without elements, Mem exists. That, though, is tautological. The argument, thus, can only be interesting if anything besides the empty set exists. That only the empty set would exist, however, is refuted by this very claim. (Gamper 2022)

The concept of “Mem” is a new layer in my version of Scientific Ontology (2019) where I discuss an implication of my redefinition of causal closure (2017). The redefinition allows causal interaction between separate ontological domains via interfaces (or, ontologically heterogeneous domains). “Mem” is defined as the first ontologically intermediate domain. Given the general definition of an interface the first interface has a form whereas the content must be accounted for. If there are any interfaces at all, however, is another question. Accordingly, I have showed that there can be a first cause but have not showed that there is one.

With the introduction of the concept of Mem, however, I do argue that there is a first cause. The argument is as strong as the claim that there are imaginary numbers. Practically, thus, Mem and other potential interfaces could be valued depending on their usefulness. Since the concept of interfaces is a modal account of a first cause, however, the argument that there cannot be a first cause (argument from monism), is no longer valid.

Structure of the meeting

– Introduction (10 min)

– Silence/present time (5 min)

– Reflections/past time (5 min)

– What do I want?/future time (5 min)

– Planning (5 min)

Best wishes,

Johan Gamper

MSc Psychology, BA Philosophy (Master thesis [2019])

Independent scholar of philosophy of mind and science, ontologist, clinical psychologist,

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2162-4918

https://philpeople.org/profiles/johan-gamper

References

Gamper, J. On a Loophole in Causal Closure. Philosophia 45, 631–636 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9791-y

Gamper, J. Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject. Axiomathes 31, 497–506 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09494-8

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On a Loophole in Causal Closure | SpringerLink

Standard definitions of causal closure focus on where the causes in question are. In this paper, the focus is changed to where they are not. Causal closure
— Läs på link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-016-9791-y

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Introductory video on Mindfulness meditation on Mem

youtube.com/watch

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Summary of the first six Open Mindfulness meditations on Mem (November, on Zoom)

I haven’t done anything like this before so it’s nice to prepare for participants on open meetings when people can show up in the last minute. There has been one participant (the first meeting) and now I think I can describe what newcomers could expect.

In mindfulness meditation you try to follow instruction and that’s it. You cannot do it wrong. You could choose to do something else but that’s another thing. Most often one come to think of something else and think that it is wrong. The trick is to remind oneself that it isn’t wrong. When one notice that one is doing something else one immediately get the chance to start over again. As the instructor it is my job to do the reminding. That is called guidance.

In the first phase the direction of the attention is suggested to be towards very concrete things, often the movement in the body related to the breathing. The meditation is “on Mem” which means that we try to take notice of any thought that in any way is associated to “Mem”. In the second phase we do the same thing with the addition of trying to remember the things that popped up in association to “Mem”. In the third phase we do the same thing as in the first with the addition of trying to notice anything one wants in relation to “Mem”. The fourth phase is the same with focus on planning.

The microphones should be muted and video is fully optional. Reflections et cetera can be shared in the chat.

I don’t find the concept less disturbing but it feels right to continue with the meditations. One of the seven basic attitudes in mindfulness practice is trust and it works for me at the moment.

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A Flaw (in modern science)

The Flaw

“When it comes to science and the explanatory system explaining focuses epistemological atoms; the things that are to be explained are measurable entities. Modern science is simply based on concepts that are defined by how they are measured. These operational definitions have the advantage that you always know what you are talking about. It is not for the scientist to understand the concepts.

Concerning consciousness it is interesting to see the operational definition for what it is, an operational definition (sic!). An operational definition is what it is. If you operationally define consciousness you do not define something else operationally. Consciousness would be defined according to the operational definition. It would neither be right, nor wrong. If consciousness is defined operationally the definition is what you are working with. Your own conception of what consciousness is, is bypassed. In the explanatory setting based on operational definitions, the intuitive understanding of consciousness and the experienced consciousness are omitted.

While this permits the machinery of the natural sciences to work with consciousness there is a flaw in the fundamental approach. The flaw does not directly concern consciousness in itself. If we define consciousness operationally with the definition X, we work with the premise that a certain subject in the experimental setting is conscious if X. This “either/or” scenario, though, becomes interesting only when we pair X with some contents. The subject, e.g., is conscious about this or that visual stimulus. Or, the subjects is conscious about this or that tactile stimulus. In the experimental setting we do not ask the subject if it sees or feels this or that. We expose the stimulus operationally, for example by putting the light on or by stroking the subjects arm. Whether or not the subject is conscious about the light or the stroking we determine via X. Without X, we conclude that the subject was not conscious about the stimulus.

The flaw is identified when we consider self-consciousness. We cannot present the self to the subject. Accordingly, if the subject is self-conscious or not we cannot determine via X. We could ask the subject but then we have already missed the target. For one thing we then must assume that subjects that do not answer are not self-conscious. Another thing is that we then miss the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness. The subject logically cannot report that it is conscious about something without being self-conscious about it. In conclusion a reasonable valid operational definition X of consciousness would not cover self-consciousness.” (Revised excerpt from Gamper, 2021.)

Reference

Gamper, J (2021). Rebooting Science 1.0. BoD. Stockholm, Sweden. https://philpapers.org/rec/GAMRS-2 (Link to the ebook on Amazon and Apple).

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Macro psychology and trauma recovery, macro psychology applied on Franz Ruppert’s theory

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On the Existence of Mem

On the Existence of Mem

Johan Gamper

Abstract

We define a set of things of one singular kind as the set of all things that can causally affect one another. To enable causal interaction between such sets we define a thing that is of a non-singular kind as consisting of more than one singular kind. Such a thing of a non-singular kind supervenes on things of singular kinds and is open to causally intervene between sets of things of different singular kinds without violating the definition of a set of things of one singular kind. With the empty set as a set of things of one singular kind we define Mem as ‘either the smallest element of intervening sets in the indefinite set of sets of things of a singular kind and the intermediate supervening sets, or, if nothing exists, the empty set’. Thus, Mem exists.

1. Definition of Mem

We will define Mem as a set of things.

1.1

Mem is related to causality and the first cause of things.

1.2

We will start with looking at the set of everything that is physical (the physical), however one individuates physical ‘things’.

1.3

We next ask if the physical consists of things (however they are individuated) of only one kind (that is, only physical things).

1.4

With that tautologically established we ask if the physical can be causally affected by anything from another set of things of another singular kind. We will answer this by defining a set of things of one singular kind as the set of all things that can causally affect one another (in principle or practically). By this the answer to the question above is ‘no’.

1.5

By defining a set of things of one singular kind as the set of all things that can causally affect one another the next question is if there are such sets. This question is multifaceted. An interesting case is the empty set. Is that set a set of all things that can causally affect one another? Or can we just ascertain that the empty set is a set of things of one singular kind since it in fact is one of a kind?

Another question is if there can be more sets than one that consists of ‘all things that can causally affect one another’.

Given our definition of a set of things of one singular kind as a set of all things that can causally affect one another two separate sets of things of a singular kind cannot causally affect one another.

1.6

We will now define a new entity that helps bring causality back in the picture. Consider the imaginary numbers and the real numbers. No imaginary number is a real number and vice versa. Based upon the imaginary numbers and the real numbers we can define complex numbers with both imaginary parts and real parts. Accordingly, we can define things that are of a non-singular kind, consisting of more than one singular kind. Also, just as complex numbers supervene on imaginary and real numbers a thing of a non-singular kind would supervene on things of singular kinds. Such a thing of a non-singular kind is open to causally intervene between two sets of things of different singular kinds without violating the definition of a set of things of one singular kind.

1.7

The things of a set of things of one singular kind (the set of all things that can causally affect one another) are now allowed to causally interact via the defined supervening set, with a set of things of another singular kind.

The number of causally linked sets of things of a singular kind is now indefinite. Between them, though, there is a supervening set as defined.

1.8

We can now define Mem in relation to the indefinite set of sets of things of a singular kind and the intermediate supervening sets. Since there is a possibility that nothing exists we also take into account the empty set which we determine is a set of things of one singular kind.

1.9

The disjunctive definition of Mem: Mem is either the smallest element of intervening sets in the indefinite set of sets of things of a singular kind and the intermediate supervening sets, or, if nothing exists, the empty set.

2. On the Existence of Mem

If there exists anything except for the empty set there is an intermediate supervening set between the empty set and the second set of things of one singular kind. That supervening set is Mem. If there exists nothing except for the empty set Mem exists (as the empty set).

3. Comment

The argument focuses a definition of a supervening set of things of a non-singular kind. Besides that, it really only claims that if we define Mem as some set of existing things or the set without elements, Mem exists. That, though, is tautological. The argument, thus, can only be interesting if anything besides the empty set exists. That only the empty set would exist, however, is refuted by this very claim.

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On a Loophole in Causal Closure: Reply to Berber & Đorđević

On a Loophole in Causal Closure: Reply to Berber & Đorđević

Working copy

Johan Gamper

Abstract

In this Reply I explain why the “loophole view” of causal closure is independent of the reasons why the Principle of the causal closure of the physical was introduced.

Keywords

Philosophy of science; ontology; causal closure; basic assumptions

Berber & Đorđević (2022) hit hard on my “loophole view” of causal closure (2017). A major blow is that my redefinition of the principle of the causal closure of the physical goes against the very reason why the principle was introduced. That, though, is not a problem for the “loophole view”. Berber & Đorđević are not explicit about the reasons why the principle was introduced but it is no secret that the scientific revolution was built upon the assumption that the physical should be explained as causally closed. The causal closure of the physical was not introduced as a basic assumption, however, but as the principle or hypothesis we are talking about. Behind the principle we have the (ancient) basic assumption that everything consists of one kind of things. But why should one claim causal closure if everything consists of one kind of things? Well, because the basic assumption can be understood in two different ways. First, if everything consists of the same kind of things, we do not need causal closure as an add-on. Second, if everything consists of one kind of things some things may consist of a:s and some other things of b:s.

To secure the foundation of the scientific revolution one had to ensure the causal closure of the physical with a hypothesis or principle but the underlying basic assumption was (and is) that everything consists of one kind of things. This basic assumption may be right or wrong. To enable scientific research, however, each ontological domain must be seen as causally closed.

If we call an ontological domain of things consisting of one kind of things a homogeneous domain, an expansion of ontology would be to consider ontologically heterogeneous domains. The corresponding basic assumption would be that there may be things consisting of more than one kind of things. To enable scientific research we would have to introduce the principle of causal closure but we would have the option to redefine it so that the potential different homogeneous domains did not causally affect one another (directly) while heterogeneous domains would be open to causally interact with homogeneous domains. I hinted at one such eventuality in (2017). Spelled out the singularity behind the Big Bang would be a heterogeneous domain causing the physical universe. Since we know of mathematical singularities an option is that the platonic mathematical universe causes the singularity behind the Big Bang. The “loophole view” of causal closure, thus, has a function if and when we try out a new basic assumption for science and not before that.

References

Berber, A., Đorđević, S. On an Alleged Loophole in Causal Closure: A Reply to Gamper. Philosophia 50, 1–6 (2022).

Gamper, J. On a Loophole in Causal Closure. Philosophia 45, 631–636 (2017).

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Preparations ahead of August 5th

Please give these questions some room

– Is everything physical physical?

– Is everything physical only physical?

– Can you consider the physical an homogeneous ontological domain?

/Johan

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Master thesis defence slides (for a canceled seminar)