Before fathering psychoanalysis, Freud first slayed the dominant Cartesian intellectual tradition of mind-body dualism
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A Flaw (in modern science)
The Flaw
“When it comes to science and the explanatory system explaining focuses epistemological atoms; the things that are to be explained are measurable entities. Modern science is simply based on concepts that are defined by how they are measured. These operational definitions have the advantage that you always know what you are talking about. It is not for the scientist to understand the concepts.
Concerning consciousness it is interesting to see the operational definition for what it is, an operational definition (sic!). An operational definition is what it is. If you operationally define consciousness you do not define something else operationally. Consciousness would be defined according to the operational definition. It would neither be right, nor wrong. If consciousness is defined operationally the definition is what you are working with. Your own conception of what consciousness is, is bypassed. In the explanatory setting based on operational definitions, the intuitive understanding of consciousness and the experienced consciousness are omitted.
While this permits the machinery of the natural sciences to work with consciousness there is a flaw in the fundamental approach. The flaw does not directly concern consciousness in itself. If we define consciousness operationally with the definition X, we work with the premise that a certain subject in the experimental setting is conscious if X. This “either/or” scenario, though, becomes interesting only when we pair X with some contents. The subject, e.g., is conscious about this or that visual stimulus. Or, the subjects is conscious about this or that tactile stimulus. In the experimental setting we do not ask the subject if it sees or feels this or that. We expose the stimulus operationally, for example by putting the light on or by stroking the subjects arm. Whether or not the subject is conscious about the light or the stroking we determine via X. Without X, we conclude that the subject was not conscious about the stimulus.
The flaw is identified when we consider self-consciousness. We cannot present the self to the subject. Accordingly, if the subject is self-conscious or not we cannot determine via X. We could ask the subject but then we have already missed the target. For one thing we then must assume that subjects that do not answer are not self-conscious. Another thing is that we then miss the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness. The subject logically cannot report that it is conscious about something without being self-conscious about it. In conclusion a reasonable valid operational definition X of consciousness would not cover self-consciousness.” (Revised excerpt from Gamper, 2021.)
Reference
Gamper, J (2021). Rebooting Science 1.0. BoD. Stockholm, Sweden. https://philpapers.org/rec/GAMRS-2 (Link to the ebook on Amazon and Apple).
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On the Existence of Mem
On the Existence of Mem
Johan Gamper
Abstract
We define a set of things of one singular kind as the set of all things that can causally affect one another. To enable causal interaction between such sets we define a thing that is of a non-singular kind as consisting of more than one singular kind. Such a thing of a non-singular kind supervenes on things of singular kinds and is open to causally intervene between sets of things of different singular kinds without violating the definition of a set of things of one singular kind. With the empty set as a set of things of one singular kind we define Mem as ‘either the smallest element of intervening sets in the indefinite set of sets of things of a singular kind and the intermediate supervening sets, or, if nothing exists, the empty set’. Thus, Mem exists.
1. Definition of Mem
We will define Mem as a set of things.
1.1
Mem is related to causality and the first cause of things.
1.2
We will start with looking at the set of everything that is physical (the physical), however one individuates physical ‘things’.
1.3
We next ask if the physical consists of things (however they are individuated) of only one kind (that is, only physical things).
1.4
With that tautologically established we ask if the physical can be causally affected by anything from another set of things of another singular kind. We will answer this by defining a set of things of one singular kind as the set of all things that can causally affect one another (in principle or practically). By this the answer to the question above is ‘no’.
1.5
By defining a set of things of one singular kind as the set of all things that can causally affect one another the next question is if there are such sets. This question is multifaceted. An interesting case is the empty set. Is that set a set of all things that can causally affect one another? Or can we just ascertain that the empty set is a set of things of one singular kind since it in fact is one of a kind?
Another question is if there can be more sets than one that consists of ‘all things that can causally affect one another’.
Given our definition of a set of things of one singular kind as a set of all things that can causally affect one another two separate sets of things of a singular kind cannot causally affect one another.
1.6
We will now define a new entity that helps bring causality back in the picture. Consider the imaginary numbers and the real numbers. No imaginary number is a real number and vice versa. Based upon the imaginary numbers and the real numbers we can define complex numbers with both imaginary parts and real parts. Accordingly, we can define things that are of a non-singular kind, consisting of more than one singular kind. Also, just as complex numbers supervene on imaginary and real numbers a thing of a non-singular kind would supervene on things of singular kinds. Such a thing of a non-singular kind is open to causally intervene between two sets of things of different singular kinds without violating the definition of a set of things of one singular kind.
1.7
The things of a set of things of one singular kind (the set of all things that can causally affect one another) are now allowed to causally interact via the defined supervening set, with a set of things of another singular kind.
The number of causally linked sets of things of a singular kind is now indefinite. Between them, though, there is a supervening set as defined.
1.8
We can now define Mem in relation to the indefinite set of sets of things of a singular kind and the intermediate supervening sets. Since there is a possibility that nothing exists we also take into account the empty set which we determine is a set of things of one singular kind.
1.9
The disjunctive definition of Mem: Mem is either the smallest element of intervening sets in the indefinite set of sets of things of a singular kind and the intermediate supervening sets, or, if nothing exists, the empty set.
2. On the Existence of Mem
If there exists anything except for the empty set there is an intermediate supervening set between the empty set and the second set of things of one singular kind. That supervening set is Mem. If there exists nothing except for the empty set Mem exists (as the empty set).
3. Comment
The argument focuses a definition of a supervening set of things of a non-singular kind. Besides that, it really only claims that if we define Mem as some set of existing things or the set without elements, Mem exists. That, though, is tautological. The argument, thus, can only be interesting if anything besides the empty set exists. That only the empty set would exist, however, is refuted by this very claim.
On a Loophole in Causal Closure: Reply to Berber & Đorđević
Working copy
Johan Gamper
Abstract
In this Reply I explain why the “loophole view” of causal closure is independent of the reasons why the Principle of the causal closure of the physical was introduced.
Keywords
Philosophy of science; ontology; causal closure; basic assumptions
Berber & Đorđević (2022) hit hard on my “loophole view” of causal closure (2017). A major blow is that my redefinition of the principle of the causal closure of the physical goes against the very reason why the principle was introduced. That, though, is not a problem for the “loophole view”. Berber & Đorđević are not explicit about the reasons why the principle was introduced but it is no secret that the scientific revolution was built upon the assumption that the physical should be explained as causally closed. The causal closure of the physical was not introduced as a basic assumption, however, but as the principle or hypothesis we are talking about. Behind the principle we have the (ancient) basic assumption that everything consists of one kind of things. But why should one claim causal closure if everything consists of one kind of things? Well, because the basic assumption can be understood in two different ways. First, if everything consists of the same kind of things, we do not need causal closure as an add-on. Second, if everything consists of one kind of things some things may consist of a:s and some other things of b:s.
To secure the foundation of the scientific revolution one had to ensure the causal closure of the physical with a hypothesis or principle but the underlying basic assumption was (and is) that everything consists of one kind of things. This basic assumption may be right or wrong. To enable scientific research, however, each ontological domain must be seen as causally closed.
If we call an ontological domain of things consisting of one kind of things a homogeneous domain, an expansion of ontology would be to consider ontologically heterogeneous domains. The corresponding basic assumption would be that there may be things consisting of more than one kind of things. To enable scientific research we would have to introduce the principle of causal closure but we would have the option to redefine it so that the potential different homogeneous domains did not causally affect one another (directly) while heterogeneous domains would be open to causally interact with homogeneous domains. I hinted at one such eventuality in (2017). Spelled out the singularity behind the Big Bang would be a heterogeneous domain causing the physical universe. Since we know of mathematical singularities an option is that the platonic mathematical universe causes the singularity behind the Big Bang. The “loophole view” of causal closure, thus, has a function if and when we try out a new basic assumption for science and not before that.
References
Berber, A., Đorđević, S. On an Alleged Loophole in Causal Closure: A Reply to Gamper. Philosophia 50, 1–6 (2022).
Gamper, J. On a Loophole in Causal Closure. Philosophia 45, 631–636 (2017).
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Wigner on consciousness and physics
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00708653
Physics and the explanation of life
Foundations of Physics volume 1, pages 35–45 (1970)
Abstract
It is proposed to consider present-day physics as dealing with a special situation, the situation in which the phenomena of life and consciousness play no role. It is pointed out that physical theory has often dealt, in the past, with similarly special situations. Planetary theory neglects all but gravitational forces, macroscopic physics neglects fluctuations due to the atomic structure of matter, nuclear physics disregards weak and gravitational interactions. In some of these cases, physicists were well aware of dealing with special situations, or limiting cases as they are called in the article; in other cases, they were not. It is pointed out that, even if it were true that present-day physics accurately describes the motion of the physical constituents of living bodies, it would not give the whole story. Arguments are adduced, however, to show that the laws of physics, applicable for inanimate matter, will have to be modified when dealing with the more general situation in which life and consciousness play significant roles.
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