30/3-26. Reluctantly I have realized that there is a problem with a new occurrence going under the label that can be referred to by a couple of letters that is in the beginning of Cain’s sibling and in the beginning of the “informant”. It belongs to the first philosophy.
Dear all,
The 2026 world congress for psychiatry accepted my four submissions that really together introduced the field of theoretical psychiatry. I really admire their courage but no entity in Sweden covered my back so they are now withdrawn. I need my job.
See, for example,
https://karlpu.org/2026/07/02/a-treadmill-test-for-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness/.
I have new ideas that should be tested. Now we have psychiatry that is dependent upon empirical findings. The anomalies are piling up. Experiencing subjects with experiences that are not measurable. They have to be understood. So that the experiencing subject feels understood.
Nota Bene. The AI psychiatrist simulates understanding when it communicates “I understand”. It is called “validation”.
Gamper, J. On a Loophole in Causal Closure.Philosophia 45, 631–636 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9791-y
Standard definitions of causal closure focus on where the causes in question are. In this paper, the focus is changed to where they are not. Causal closure is linked to the principle that no cause of another universe causes an event in a particular universe. This view permits the one universe to be affected by the other via an interface. An interface between universes can be seen as a domain that violates the suggested account of causal closure, suggesting a view in which universes are causally closed whereas interfaces are not. On this basis, universes are not affected by other universes directly but rather indirectly.
Johan Gamper. (2024). On a Loophole in Quantum Gravity. Qeios. doi:10.32388/RM0TK5.4.
I show that general relativity and quantum mechanics, broadly construed, are consistent in relation to the singularities inside of black holes, if the singularities inside of black holes are interfaces.
Say that if the singularities inside of black holes have no extension in space-time they cannot be accounted for by quantum mechanics if quantum mechanics only is meaningful for events at least of the Planck length. Also, say that this would imply that general relativity is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. I will show that this inconsistency is dependent upon a premise that can be questioned.
Loophole causal closure (Gamper, 2017) predicts that the physical universe is preceded by an earlier one (that can be mathematical). This is made possible by a redefinition of the principle of causal closure. The redefinition makes interfaces between universes consistent with the principle of causal closure, which is why it is ontologically meaningful to consider the possibility of a multiverse.
The premise referred to in the Introduction is that the singularity inside of a black hole is situated in the physical universe. If there is only one universe and that universe is physical, of course, the singularity inside of a black hole is in the physical universe. If we consider, however, that there might be more than one universe and that loophole causal closure is true, we admit that there can be interfaces. According to this view, black hole singularities can be viewed as interfaces.
This scenario can be unpacked as follows. Let us define the black hole predicament as the situation where the singularity inside of the black hole is mathematical in its nature. Then we cannot explain how it has the non-mathematical, physical property of having mass. At the same time, it has mass, which is why it cannot be purely mathematical.
One solution is to view the black hole singularity as an interface between the physical universe and the mathematical universe. According to this view, the black hole singularity has a dual existence, it is both physical and mathematical.
I have written about this possibility elsewhere. See, for instance, (2023).
Accepted workshop for WADP2027, Vienna
Congress 2027 Vienna
Presentation Title:Psychic Energy and Macro Psychology
Abstract
Tragically, the society treats us as biological objects. In this workshop we investigate and discuss how this can be countered via the possibility of non-chemical biological energy and non-biological psychic energy. The starting point is Johan Gamper (2021, 2024). We apply the concepts to understand the background of psychiatric conditions and also the principles behind major psychotherapeutic methods.
References
Gamper, J (2021). Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject. Axiomathes 31, 497–506.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10516-020-09494-8
Gamper, J. (2024). Macro Psychology. Qeios. https://www.qeios.com/read/QTI0VB
Gamper, J. Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject. Axiomathes31, 497–506 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09494-8
As physical things have mathematical properties we in this paper let mental things have biological properties. The work is based on recent metaphysical findings that shows that there could be interfaces between separate ontological domains. According to this view there could be mathematical objects, physical objects, and also mental objects. The aim of this study is to establish a view of the biological object that allows it to possibly generate the experiencing subject. Based on the notion that energy per se is related to the ability of a system to do some work, biological energy is defined as a biological object’s ability to recover from the load it is exposed to. Introducing the concept of the experiencing subject, the experiencing subject would be the agent experiencing the biological object’s need of recovery from the load it is exposed to. Once established, the experiencing subject may develop non-biological needs. On this basis experiencing subjects have biological properties without being biological in exactly the same manner as physical things have mathematical properties without being mathematical (would that be the case).
For those interested in the philosophy of biology I want to push for three papers of mine (2021, 2023, 2024) that go a far distance from mainstream philosophy of biology.
The first one focuses the relationship between biological objects and experiencing subjects. The other one focuses the relation between the biological object and consciousness in a formal setting. The third one focuses the biological simple in relation to, for instance, the physical simple.
References
Gamper, J. Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject. Axiomathes 31, 497–506 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09494-8
Johan Gamper. (2023). Formal Theology. Qeios. doi:10.32388/EMANIB. [section 4.2.1]
Johan Gamper. (2024). Causal Principles in Material Constitution: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Composition of Objects. Qeios. doi:10.32388/H2B7NA.2.
Johan Gamper, psychologist, philosopher
Independent researcher
Johan Gamper. (2024). The Basic Fault in the Philosophy of Science. Qeios. doi:10.32388/BBM3ZU.
The basic fault in the philosophy of science is simple enough to put in words and now it is time to do that. This basic fault puts the food on the table for philosophers and scientists, so it is hard to actually get the word out. That is not my problem, though. The basic fault is that we still assume that there is some kind of stuff that ‘everything’ consists of. My aim is to show how we can make it right.
Numbers, dreams, marbles and chickens, according to this assumption (that there is some kind of stuff that ‘everything’ consists of), must consist of this kind of stuff. By the famous equation of Albert Einstein, the modern version of the assumption is that everything, in the final analysis, is physical energy. Numbers, at least, accordingly, have no existence of their own. Would they, nota bene, the physical world as we know it, would not exist.
The informed reader may now ask, ‘How could it be otherwise? Is it not analytical, that anything consists of only one kind of stuff?’ On the surface, yes. All material things are physical and therefore made of physical energy (this is a bit simplified). The problem is the potential existence of non-physical things. If there were such, how could they interact with the physical things? Traditionally, since the question was raised by Princess Elisabeth, the answer has been that there cannot be any interaction between things of different ontological kinds. Things of different ontological kinds are, in short, by themselves, toodifferent.
In order not to be forced to deny the existence of, say, numbers and dreams, philosophers and scientists tend to say that they in the final analysis somehow are physical (if they exist, they are not non-physical).
The informed reader may now be bored. ‘We have heard this. Over and over again. What is your point?’ Fair enough. ‘We are not a simulation.’ That is the short answer. We are what we are (humans). Numbers are what they are (mathematical entities). The crucial question is not how physical things relate to mathematical entities or how physical things relate to, say, dreams. The crucial question is — I do not know how to say this… — if we can let go of the past and consider things that are not made up of only one kind of stuff?
I know that it may sound grotesque but what I have in mind is something like this.
Consider the imaginary numbers and the real numbers. No imaginary number is a real number and vice versa. Based on the imaginary numbers and the real numbers we can define complex numbers with both imaginary parts and real parts. Accordingly, we can define complex things consisting of more than one kind of stuff. My favourite candidates are consciousness and black hole singularities. We could define consciousness as having both biological parts and (non-biological) subjective parts. Likewise, we could define black hole singularities as having both physical parts and (non-physical) mathematical parts.
I will stop here for now. Some of the things I have stated I have touched upon before. See especially (2017, 2021a, 2021b, 2023a and 2023b).
The employer, SLSO, Region Stockholm, Sweden, doesn’t support this research. The research is affiliated to Johan Gamper’s philosophical hobby project “Adalja”. This may lead to withdrawal of the posters but please reach out if you are interested in the content.
103 MUST THE EXPERIENCING SUBJECT BE NON-BIOLOGICAL FOR COMPASSION TO BE AN INTEGRATED PART OF THE PSYCHIATRIC SETTING?
Johan Gamper
Region Stockholm, Brandbergens vårdcentral, Brandbergen, Sweden
AS56 – PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANITIES IN PSYCHIATRY – WHAT IS THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN PSYCHIATRY?
Abstract Submission
Objectives
In this submission I answer yes to the question posed in the title, building on Gamper, 2021). The possibility comes to a price though, an intricate redefinition of the notion of biological energy. An even higher price is the abandonment of the Aristotelian first philosophy.
Reference
Gamper, J. Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject. Axiomathes 31, 497–506 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09494-8
Methods
Deducation.
Results
It is shown that a biological object can have an experiencing subject. Since psychiatric condidtions per definition manifest themselves as part of subjective experiences clinicians must use their own subective exeperinces to use their compassion in the clinical setting.
Conclusions
The result is a turning point for psychiatry and psychiatrists now can use their experiences in their practise.
#111 FORMAL AND AXIOMATIC PSYCHIATRY
Johan Gamper
Region Stockholm, Brandbergens vårdcentral, Brandbergen, Sweden
AS56 – PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANITIES IN PSYCHIATRY – WHAT IS THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN PSYCHIATRY?
Abstract Submission
Objectives
I just want to lay on the table two related but unexplored fields For future research. The first comes from an attempt to axiomatize the natural laws (Gamper 2023a) and the other from an attempt to find formal relations between very different fields (Gamper (2023b).
References
Johan Gamper. (2023a). On the Axiomatisation of the Natural Laws — A Compilation of Human Mistakes Intended to Be Understood Only By Robots. Qeios. doi:10.32388/KC9YAU.
Johan Gamper. (2023b). Formal Theology. Qeios. doi:10.32388/EMANI
Methods
Formal and axiomatic deduction.
Results
The axiomatical attempt is very sketchy but it if successfull the result would pull psychiatry closer to formal scences.
The formal approach is very promising. Among other things it identifies a formal link between self-consciousness and black hole singularities.
Conclusions
This could be a start for psychiatry to be really integrated with the other sciences.
#131 MACRO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPY
Johan Gamper
Region Stockholm, Brandbergens vårdcentral, Brandbergen, Sweden
AS56 – PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANITIES IN PSYCHIATRY – WHAT IS THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN PSYCHIATRY?
Abstract Submission
Objectives
This work builds upon the paper Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject (Gamper, J, Axiomathes, 2020). The focus is to show how the idea of an experiencing subject can be conceived of within modern psychotherapy. We follow the track from conditioning for animals (without concern for an experiencing subject), via behavioral therapy for humans with an experiencing subject and cognitive behavioral therapy for humans with an experiencing subject where we give the subject a rational for the behavioral modification, to psychodynamically oriented therapy where we confront the very subject without going via her behavior. The three methods are explained within the context of macro psychology. Conditioning concerns therapeutic methods that does not address subjective experiences of the patient and neither address subjective experiences methodologically. For instance, you do not give the patient instructions since you do not rely on the patients ability to understand them. Behavioral therapy concerns methods that that are mediated by instructions. The patient is told to follow a procedure. Cognitive behavioral therapy adds explanations to the behavioral therapy. Psychodynamically oriented therapy concerns thesubject’stendency to repress difficult inner material to feel better. This material is focused in the therapy and the patient is informed about how the therapist understands the dynamic. The framework, thus, that is presented, encompasses the major psychotherapeutic methods of today.
Methods
Deduction from clinical trial and error.
Results
An integrated view of modern psychotherapies.
Conclusions
Macro psychology can help bridge the gap between theoretical and clinical psychology.
#169 BIOLOGICAL PARTS AND BIOLOGICAL WHOLES — LESSONS FOR PSYCHIATRY
Johan Gamper
Region Stockholm, Brandbergens vårdcentral, Brandbergen, Sweden
AS56 – PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANITIES IN PSYCHIATRY – WHAT IS THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN PSYCHIATRY?
Abstract Submission
Objectives
Philosophically, it has been hard to determine how parts and wholes are related. Gamper (2024) suggests causal principles to solve the puzzle. For hundreds of years biology has discussed what the essential part of biological organisms is. Gamper (ibid.) makes a suggestion and uses it to compose living things, organisms. As biological objects this affects psychiatry too. Wee need to take into consideration the causal principles at hand and act accordingly. Psychiatrists don’t simulate flying. They fly.
Reference
Johan Gamper. (2024). Causal Principles in Material Constitution: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Composition of Objects. Qeios. doi:10.32388/H2B7NA.2. https://www.qeios.com/read/H2B7NA.2
Methods
We use a new mereological thesis to put psychiatry in perspective vis-a-vis other causal settings.
Results
Psychiatry, as having to do wih biological objects, is shown to be equally dealing with physical objects as other sciences.
Conclusions
This is a purely philosophical (mereological) study and may be used to inspire research into causal connections within psychiatry.
Johan Gamper. (2023). Formal Theology. Qeios. doi:10.32388/EMANIB.
Adalja 