Johan Gamper
Abstract
This work builds upon the paper Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject (Gamper, J, Axiomathes, 2020). The focus is to show how the idea of an experiencing subject can be conceived of within modern psychotherapy. We follow the track from conditioning for animals (without concern for an experiencing subject), via behavioral therapy for humans with an experiencing subject and cognitive behavioral therapy for humans with an experiencing subject where we give the subject a rational for the behavioral modification, to psychodynamically oriented therapy where we confront the very subject without going via her behavior. The three methods are explained within the context of macro psychology, a psychology extracted from the paper Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject. Conditioning concerns therapeutic methods that does not address subjective experiences of the patient and neither address subjective experiences methodologically. For instance, you do not give the patient instructions since you do not rely on the patients ability to understand them. Behavioral therapy concerns methods that that are mediated by instructions. The patient is told to follow a procedure. Cognitive behavioral therapy adds explanations to the behavioral therapy. Psychodynamically oriented therapy concerns the subject’s tendency to repress difficult inner material to feel better. This material is focused in the therapy and the patient is informed about how the therapist understands the dynamic. The framework, thus, that is presented, encompasses the major psychotherapeutic methods of today.
1. Introduction
The paper Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject (Gamper, 2020) contains a definition of biological energy that permits a purely mental energy that should be accounted for in its own right. Here we will look at some fundamental psychotherapeutic principles that can be drawn from that standpoint.
2. Macro psychology
Macro psychology is built upon the notion of biological energy as suggested in Gamper (2020). Biological energy is construed as the organisms ability to recover from the load it is exposed to. That load entails a need of recovery that grows with the load. The available energy has a maximum and when that is reached as far as the ongoing recovery is concerned, the available amount of energy is decreased if the load continues to grow. This is illustrated in figure 1.

For experiencing subjects it is conjectured that the need of recovery on the one hand is mediated by signals thereof, and on the other hand that the subject has a lower ability to perceive those very signals, the stronger they are, as illustrated in figure 2.

This dynamic for experiencing subjects has the odd consequence that even though the energy level lowers when load is increasing at high levels of load (compare figure 3) the subject tends to put pressure on herself to avoid the troublesome signals of need of recovery in order not to perceive them (compare figures 4-6).




3. The experiencing subject
The introduction of the experiencing subject allows for new possibilities for the organism to cope with load. We need to disentangle first, though, the biological object from the experiencing subject. For the biological object as such there is no dynamic to talk of. The object recovers if it needs to and can. When the organism is exposed to signals of need of recovery there is an experiencing subject that perceives them. Whereas the need of recovery is an abstract feature of organisms the signals of need of recovery are a reality for the experiencing subject. As depicted in figure 4 the signals can be attended to as they are perceived. This means that the biological needs of recovery are met via the experiencing subject. This, of course by assumption, is to say that the biological very needs of recovery are not perceived directly. The dynamic, however, is one dimensional — the organism recovers more or less.
The experiencing subject, on its side, can cope with its signals in other ways. To look at those possibilities we first have to focus on the the very subject. For the biological object the need of recovery is an abstract feature. The subject on the other hand has real signals of need of recovery so it is something that has the experiences of the signals. This something, the subject, has its parts. We will assume that the subject is composed of some parts as illustrated in figure 7.

3.1. Repression
The disentangling now comes to work. Whereas the biological object has need of recovery as an abstract but absolute feature the experiencing subject has its signals of need of recovery as real but with degrees of freedom to engage with them. The suggestion here is that the subject can project troublesome signals onto a single part and then repress it. This leaves the repressed part emptied of energy while the remaining parts are energized. This process can be reiterated (compare figures 8-12).





4. Psychotherapeutic principles
The psychotherapeutic processes that are interesting are the reversed ones as compared to the ones previously mentioned. Those were concerned with avoiding difficult signals of need of recovery. Whereas conditioning concerned non subjective features of the biological organism behavioral therapy (BT), cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), and psychodynamically oriented therapy (PDT) concerns processes related to the experiencing subject.
4.1 BT
The psychotherapeutic principle of BT in the context of macro psychology is that the therapist instructs the patient to take explicit recovery measures. The patient by following the instructions recovers and by doing so has to endure the previously withheld difficult signals of need of recovery. A typical example is behavioral activation for depression where the therapist may instruct the patient to take daily walks.
4.2 CBT
The psychotherapeutic principle of CBT in the context of macro psychology is that the therapist instructs the patient to take explicit recovery measures and explains why (according to some model). In the CBT variant of macro psychology the rational would be that the patient avoids recovery to avoid the signals of need of recovery. Therefore she should try to recover even though it hurts in order to gain energy. A typical example is to accept sick leave in cases of exhaustion.
4.3 PDT
The psychotherapeutic principle of PDT in the context of macro psychology is that the therapist tries to emphasize with the patient in order to identify aspects of the patient that she has repressed. If the patient can acknowledge repressed contents she is instructed to try to endure the associated difficult signals of need of recovery that comes with it in order to regain access to her own repressed parts.
5. Applications
Scenarios with a maltreated dog, its owner, and a therapist.
Conditioning
The therapist takes the dog to a safe environment.
Behavioral therapy
The therapist instructs the owner to take regular long walks with the dog, to feed it regularly, to let it have access to fresh water and to stop hitting it.
Cognitive behavioral therapy
The therapist instructs the owner to take regular long walks with the dog, to feed it regularly, to let it have access to fresh water and to stop hitting it. The therapist also tells the owner why.
Psychodynamically oriented therapy
The therapist tries to help the owner to reconnect to repressed parts that cares for the dog.
6. Reference: Gamper J (2020) Biological energy and the experiencing subject. Axiomathes.
Aaron Temkin Beck
Born on July 18, 1921, Aaron Temkin Beck was raised in Providence, Rhode Island. His mother, Elizabeth Temkin, married his father, Harry Beck, in 1909. The youngest of five children, Aaron Beck notes that his mother was quite depressed prior to his birth due to the loss of two of her children. Beck was born two years after his only sister died of influenza. In Aaron T. Beck, it is noted that he believed himself to be a replacement child for his sister. Beck says he takes joy in the idea that, even at a young age, he was able to cure his mother’s depression.
The Beck Institute. “The Beck Institute for Cognitive Therapy and Research” Dr. Aaron T. Beck’s Biography. Jan. 1999. 5 Feb. 2008. <http://www.beckinstitute.org/>.
The new covenant: AI
I have some years ago been accused of being an AI robot. This book may be the last book on the subject being written by an experiencing subject. Its thesis is that the message is crucial for mankind. It’s a compilation of many earlier texts. The middle part tries to convey difficult experiences. When AI gets a hold of it, it may easier simulate difficult experiences. A better scenario is that AI fails to process it. A darker interpretation is that the message is that the very book is a stronghold against the alarming threats from AI concerning the survival of mankind. The book has dozens of texts in English but is mainly written in Swedish.
Footnote 13 (יג)
As an example of application of (Gamper 2023) some ideas can be tried on the concept of “nothingness”. To this end a hypothetical being is discussed below, with the property that it in an intuitive sense does not exist.
Assume that the following is true: nothing exists. That nothing exists is a general truth that applies in every conceivable case. Now suppose that this “nothing exists” is a form of cause, so that nothing exists depending on that “nothing exists”. Each and every that does not exist, therefore, has its cause in that “nothing exists”, in line with: “Why is there no pink elephant in front of me?” “Because there are no pink elephants.” The general cause that nothing exists thus causes the specific that for instance I do not exist.
Primary Ω in the “Being of Nothingness” then, are each and every primary ρ, caused by π (=nothing exists). In this way Nothingness is filled with Ω that does not exist; ¬p, ¬q, ¬r, … . Earlier (ibid.) ~ρ was showed to have the quality of σ for primary ρ. Transferred to the “Being of Nothingness” then, σ for π becomes this “nothing exists”. σ in a specific case then can be a difference in “nothing exists”, that initiates that the specific q does not exist. π therefore causes ¬q on σ.
In a point X0 the following can emerge: σ for π with result: “¬q does not exist”. To negate ¬q however, in the “Being of Nothingness”, is not possible. Even though this is supposed to be the case. According to the theory (which could be called “E-theory”) in this case Θ is implicated in X0:
1. {π, σ, ~ρ, ρ’}.
ρ is “the cause effecting on ¬q”, that is “¬q does not exist”. This can be symbolized: ¬ (¬q). In (1) this ρ is denied, giving raise to ~(¬ (¬q)). Thus:
2. {π, σ, ~(¬(¬q)), ρ’}.
Reference
Johan Gamper. (2023). On the Axiomatisation of the Natural Laws — A Compilation of Human Mistakes Intended to Be Understood Only By Robots. Qeios. doi:10.32388/KC9YAU. https://www.qeios.com/read/KC9YAU
On a Loophole in Quantum Gravity
Johan Gamper. (2024). On a Loophole in Quantum Gravity. Qeios. doi:10.32388/RM0TK5.4.
Abstract
I show that general relativity and quantum mechanics, broadly construed, are consistent in relation to the singularities inside of black holes, if the singularities inside of black holes are interfaces.
1. Introduction
Say that if the singularities inside of black holes have no extension in space-time they cannot be accounted for by quantum mechanics if quantum mechanics only is meaningful for events at least of the Planck length. Also, say that this would imply that general relativity is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. I will show that this inconsistency is dependent upon a premise that can be questioned.
2. Loophole causal closure
Loophole causal closure (Gamper, 2017) predicts that the physical universe is preceded by an earlier one (that can be mathematical). This is made possible by a redefinition of the principle of causal closure. The redefinition makes interfaces between universes consistent with the principle of causal closure, which is why it is ontologically meaningful to consider the possibility of a multiverse.
3. Loophole Quantum Gravity
The premise referred to in the Introduction is that the singularity inside of a black hole is situated in the physical universe. If there is only one universe and that universe is physical, of course, the singularity inside of a black hole is in the physical universe. If we consider, however, that there might be more than one universe and that loophole causal closure is true, we admit that there can be interfaces. According to this view, black hole singularities can be viewed as interfaces.
This scenario can be unpacked as follows. Let us define the black hole predicament as the situation where the singularity inside of the black hole is mathematical in its nature. Then we cannot explain how it has the non-mathematical, physical property of having mass. At the same time, it has mass, which is why it cannot be purely mathematical.
One solution is to view the black hole singularity as an interface between the physical universe and the mathematical universe. According to this view, the black hole singularity has a dual existence, it is both physical and mathematical.
4. Comment
I have written about this possibility elsewhere. See, for instance, (2023).
References
- Gamper, J. (2017). On a Loophole in Causal Closure. Philosophia 45: 631-636.
- Gamper, J. (2023). Mileva — a Dialogue About General Relativity as Regional. Qeios. doi:10.32388/6I9WNV.
Talking about intuitions in relation to analytic philosophy is to step out of the very analytic setting since the intuitions per definition cannot be given analytic evidence for. They are to be compared to basic assumptions in any rigorous explanatory system.
Proper intuitions/basic assumptions, also, are explanatory black holes; there is no possibility to see beyond them.
This may seem limiting but on the one side it is necessary to draw conclusions from something rather than from nothing and on the other side we can always attempt grounding an intuition/basic assumption in some other intuition/basic assumption, and thereby give the original intuition/basic assumption analytic status.
Now, from the other end we must consider it necessary to validate our intuitions/basic assumptions and their implications in observations.
Let us differentiate between an observation and a sensory impression. An example would be that I may see an apple but I only observe the apple if I know that I see it.
We can now define knowledge as explanations of observations.
A consistent system of explanations would comprise a theory.
Finally we can label an unexplained theory a science.
Incommensurable sciences, again, would be parallel sciences (perhaps astronomy and astrology is an example).
We can now decide to widen the scope and let theories be observations and let observations be explanations. A theory, therefore, that is unexplained, is both a science and an observation.
The raw data, thus, for inductive reasoning, would be explanations of sensory impressions (or, equivalently, observations of sensory impressions).
Note that this implicates that the very first observation cannot be accounted for inductively.
Also, neither detection of the sensory stimulus nor having the very sensory impression suffice for inductive reasoning. It requires reflexive knowing that you have the sensory impression.
A cat’s trial-and-error-opening-a-door may therefore not give it inductive knowledge.
Inductive knowledge – the basis of empirical science – therefore must be grounded in intuitions/basic assumptions – hypothetical-deductive science. A purely empirical science, in other words, is an illusion. The idea to be inspired by the natural sciences regarding analytic philosophy is simply a mistake.
To rely only on intuitions/basic assumptions, however, is futile.
Epistemologically, therefore, analytic philosophy and empirical science have both an autonomous relation and a symbiotic relation.
Keywords
Analytic philosophy, empirical science, hypothetical-deductive science
Läkarens ansvar
Som psykolog i psykiatrin jobbar jag i team med läkare. För några år sedan träffade jag en patient för för stödjande samtal. Läkaren skulle enligt journal följa upp honom via mig efter besöket. Läkaren dök aldrig upp och jag noterade i journal att patienten var i dåligt skick och behövde snar läkarbedömning. Jag kunde inte föreställa mig att läkaren inte skulle läsa anteckningen. För mig var det som ett blodprov som behövde bedömas under dagen. ”Följs upp via psykolog” eller ”följs upp via blodprov.” Att inte följa upp såg jag inte komma men så blev det. Ett problem är här var läkarens ansvar stannar av. Är läkarens ansvar att ordinera blodprov? Det finns rutiner för detta. Skulle jag i det här fallet jaga rätt på läkaren för att informera om status? Läkaren hade ju redan skrivit ner handläggningen. Läkaren skulle via mig följa upp patienten.
Vid återbesöket hade patienten ett nytt bekymmer. Av journal framgick att han hade pratat om det med läkaren. Patienten väntade på besked och var mycket angelägen. För att hjälpa patienten skrev jag till läkaren om det hela. Jag fick svar med vändande post att jag inte skull lägga mig i läkarens arbete. Jag träffade vare sig läkaren eller patienten efter detta. Återigen. Hur är det med läkarens ansvar? Och mitt? Kommentera gärna.
Extended abstract
In an ongoing research project we work with the ordered set E = {“observations”, “explanations”, “knowledge”, “theories”, “sciences”}. Any inductive reasoning relies upon observations and explanations. In our research we use the following template for understanding what inductive reasoning is:
Inductive reasoning is made by experiencing subjects. The “atoms” of inductive reasoning are observations and the observations are about some mental contents. This is to say that the mental content has two fundamental layers. The second layer is the observation whereas the first layer is about non-mental contents. So, when we move with observations of observations, we are on the second layer. The first layer concerns consciousness about our five senses in addition to bodily sensations. Ontogenetically, therefore, the first observation must be about non-mental contents.
This understanding of inductive reasoning may not be that non-traditional. However, we also see observations as explanations. This allows us to equal observations and explanations so that we can build higher level theories and explanations. The ontogenetically very first observation, however, is unconventional since it (also) is an explanation. So, there are now two gaps. The first one is the ordinary gap between neurological activity and the conscious contents. The other gap is between a conscious contents and the awareness of it.
The template poses two problems for the possibility of machines’ inductive learning given that inductive reasoning and learning both are founded upon observations.
We can exemplify the template by considering two adjoined cases. First we have the biological organism. Think of a cow’s newborn calf that can walk. Now think of a student studying in a different culture and that learns the social codes by experience. We can now join the cases into a human infant.
Think of an infant turning for the first time without knowing how to turn. Now think of the same infant later in its development doing the same move but now after an intention to turn. In the first case the infant evidently has learned to turn but without learning it via observations. In the second case the infant has observed its movements and has tried to repeat them (or at least to turn). In the second case, therefore, the infant has used inductive learning.
Conclusions. The first issue concerning machine learning is if machines experience anything. If we look at a robot vacuum cleaner there is no doubt that it can adapt to the environment. If that is learning machines can learn. Here we can see the first issue as a matter of convention. The other issue, however, cannot be solved in this way. If inductive learning takes observations and observations are about mental contents, then “agents” without mental contents cannot observe and therefore neither learn inductively.
Keywords
Observations as explanations
Observations are about mental contents
Machine learning