Author: Johan Gamper

Background

Our scientific paradigm is so consolidated that it in many camps functions as a whirlpool that drags everything into it. This leaves the door open for exploitation of the cracks between the paradigmatic world view and the reality. This creates tension that cannot be monitored from within the paradigm.

Plan B

Michael Cain’s character Professor John Brand in the movie Interstellar has a Plan A for the survival of mankind. If that doesn’t work he has a backup Plan B. Plan A is the wanted one whereas Plan B saves some astronauts and a lot of fertilized eggs.

Today we have a scientific culture that functions as our Plan A. That culture states that everything in one way or the other is physical. A recent shift in our language is the move from “my thoughts are in my mind” to “my thoughts are in my brain”. If we have thoughts and everything in the end is physical it is natural to think that one’s thoughts are in one’s brain.

In preparation for the defense of my master thesis (Gamper 2019) I played with an application of it and found that it provided an ontologically neutral view of the scientific object. I had introduced the concept of causal objects and it applied for any kind of object (with a causal background). In my preparation I saw that separate ontological fields could be joined by something I called interfaces (2017). Accordingly, everything in the end may be physical – or not. I thought this eventuality was very interesting.

Plan B is to investigate this possibility and see where it may lead. One thing is established, though, and that is that the mind can be a substance of its own. Provided that there can be interfaces between ontological domains.

Variation 3

“When it comes to science and the explanatory system explaining focuses epistemological atoms; the things that are to be explained are measurable entities. Modern science is simply based on concepts that are defined by how they are measured. These operational definitions have the advantage that you always know what you are talking about. It is not for the scientist to understand the concepts.

Concerning consciousness it is interesting to see the operational definition for what it is, an operational definition (sic!). An operational definition is what it is. If you operationally define consciousness you do not define something else operationally. Consciousness would be defined according to the operational definition. It would neither be right, nor wrong. If consciousness is defined operationally the definition is what you are working with. Your own conception of what consciousness is, is bypassed. In the explanatory setting based on operational definitions, the intuitive understanding of consciousness and the experienced consciousness are omitted.

While this permits the machinery of the natural sciences to work with consciousness there is a a flaw in the fundamental approach. The flaw does not directly concern consciousness in itself. If we define consciousness operationally with the definition X, we work with the premise that a certain subject in the experimental setting is conscious if X. This “either/or” scenario, though, becomes interesting only when we pair X with some contents. The subject, e.g., is conscious about this or that visual stimulus. Or, the subjects is conscious about this or that tactile stimulus. In the experimental setting we do not ask the subject if it sees or feels this or that. We expose the stimulus operationally, for example by putting the light on or by stroking the subjects arm. Whether or not the subject is conscious about the light or the stroking we determine via X. Without X, we conclude that the subject was not conscious about the stimulus.

The flaw is identified when we consider self-consciousness. We cannot present the self to the subject. Accordingly, if the subject is self-conscious or not we cannot determine via X. We could ask the subject but then we have already missed the target. For one thing we then must assume that subjects that do not answer are not self-conscious. Another thing is that we then miss the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness. The subject logically cannot report that it is conscious about something without being self-conscious about it. In conclusion a reasonable valid operational definition X of consciousness would not cover self-consciousness.” (Revised excerpt from Gamper (2021.)

The variation is that the empirical science is dependent upon operational definitions why it cannot account for self-consciousness. Our understanding of self-consciousness needs to be based on something else.

References

Gamper, J (2021). Rebooting Science 1.0. BoD. Stockholm, Sweden. https://philpapers.org/rec/GAMRS-2 (Link to the ebook on Amazon and Apple).

Gamper, J. Blocking the Vagueness Block – A New Restricted Answer to the Special Composition Question. Philosophia 47, 425–428 (2019).

Gamper, J. On a Loophole in Causal Closure. Philosophia 45, 631–636 (2017).

I’m so totally fed up with the philosophical-scientific paradigm that balances on the idea that everything is made up of only one kind of ontological stuff. It’s old. It’s lame. It comes to no god. It only defends itself. I’m sorry but it’s so dead that you suffocate in it. The alternative is to let the earth be spherical. It is to let mathematical things be mathematical and to let mental things be mental.

From within the paradigm I have got two kinds of answers; you are wrong because you are wrong and you are wrong because you are wrong. It’s devastating. Don’t go near the edge. You might fall off. Please come up with something new.

I have some years ago been accused of being an AI robot. This book may be the last book on the subject being written by an experiencing subject. Its thesis is that the message is crucial for mankind. It’s a compilation of many earlier texts. The middle part tries to convey difficult experiences. When AI gets a hold of it, it may easier simulate difficult experiences. A better scenario is that AI fails to process it. A darker interpretation is that the message is that the very book is a stronghold against the alarming threats from AI concerning the survival of mankind. Two previous works (2017, 2020) are examples of academic torches in the fight for human values. The book has dozens of texts in English but is mainly written in Swedish.

References

Gamper, J. (2017). On a Loophole in Causal Closure.Philosophia 45, 631–636. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9791-y

Gamper, J. (2021). Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject. Axiomathes 31, 497–506. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09494-8

Talking about intuitions in relation to analytic philosophy is to step out of the very analytic setting since the intuitions per definition cannot be given analytic evidence for. They are to be compared to basic assumptions in any rigorous explanatory system.

Proper intuitions/basic assumptions, also, are explanatory black holes; there is no possibility to see beyond them.

This may seem limiting but on the one side it is necessary to draw conclusions from something rather than from nothing and on the other side we can always attempt grounding an intuition/basic assumption in some other intuition/basic assumption, and thereby give the original intuition/basic assumption analytic status.

Now, from the other end we must consider it necessary to validate our intuitions/basic assumptions and their implications in observations.

Let us differentiate between an observation and a sensory impression. An example would be that I may see an apple but I only observe the apple if I know that I see it.

We can now define knowledge as explanations of observations.

A consistent system of explanations would comprise a theory.

Finally we can label an unexplained theory a science.

Incommensurable sciences, again, would be parallel sciences (perhaps astronomy and astrology is an example).

We can now decide to widen the scope and let theories be observations and let observations be explanations. A theory, therefore, that is unexplained, is both a science and an observation.

The raw data, thus, for inductive reasoning, would be explanations of sensory impressions (or, equivalently, observations of sensory impressions).

Note that this implicates that the very first observation cannot be accounted for inductively.

Also, neither detection of the sensory stimulus nor having the very sensory impression suffice for inductive reasoning. It requires reflexive knowing that you have the sensory impression.

A cat’s trial-and-error-opening-a-door may therefore not give it inductive knowledge.

Inductive knowledge – the basis of empirical science – therefore must be grounded in intuitions/basic assumptions – hypothetical-deductive science. A purely empirical science, in other words, is an illusion. The idea to be inspired by the natural sciences regarding analytic philosophy is simply a mistake.

To rely only on intuitions/basic assumptions, however, is futile.

Epistemologically, therefore, analytic philosophy and empirical science have both an autonomous relation and a symbiotic relation.

Keywords

Analytic philosophy, empirical science, hypothetical-deductive science

Born on July 18, 1921, Aaron Temkin Beck was raised in Providence, Rhode Island. His mother, Elizabeth Temkin, married his father, Harry Beck, in 1909. The youngest of five children, Aaron Beck notes that his mother was quite depressed prior to his birth due to the loss of two of her children. Beck was born two years after his only sister died of influenza. In Aaron T. Beck, it is noted that he believed himself to be a replacement child for his sister. Beck says he takes joy in the idea that, even at a young age, he was able to cure his mother’s depression.

The Beck Institute. “The Beck Institute for Cognitive Therapy and Research” Dr. Aaron T. Beck’s Biography. Jan. 1999. 5 Feb. 2008. <http://www.beckinstitute.org/&gt;.

Som psykolog i psykiatrin jobbar jag i team med läkare. För några år sedan träffade jag en patient för för stödjande samtal. Läkaren skulle enligt journal följa upp honom via mig efter besöket. Läkaren dök aldrig upp och jag noterade i journal att patienten var i dåligt skick och behövde snar läkarbedömning. Jag kunde inte föreställa mig att läkaren inte skulle läsa anteckningen. För mig var det som ett blodprov som behövde bedömas under dagen. ”Följs upp via psykolog” eller ”följs upp via blodprov.” Att inte följa upp såg jag inte komma men så blev det. Ett problem är här var läkarens ansvar stannar av. Är läkarens ansvar att ordinera blodprov? Det finns rutiner för detta. Skulle jag i det här fallet jaga rätt på läkaren för att informera om status? Läkaren hade ju redan skrivit ner handläggningen. Läkaren skulle via mig följa upp patienten.

Vid återbesöket hade patienten ett nytt bekymmer. Av journal framgick att han hade pratat om det med läkaren. Patienten väntade på besked och var mycket angelägen. För att hjälpa patienten skrev jag till läkaren om det hela. Jag fick svar med vändande post att jag inte skull lägga mig i läkarens arbete. Jag träffade vare sig läkaren eller patienten efter detta. Återigen. Hur är det med läkarens ansvar? Och mitt? Kommentera gärna.

Extended abstract

In an ongoing research project we work with the ordered set E = {“observations”, “explanations”, “knowledge”, “theories”, “sciences”}. Any inductive reasoning relies upon observations and explanations. In our research we use the following template for understanding what inductive reasoning is:

Inductive reasoning is made by experiencing subjects. The “atoms” of inductive reasoning are observations and the observations are about some mental contents. This is to say that the mental content has two fundamental layers. The second layer is the observation whereas the first layer is about non-mental contents. So, when we move with observations of observations, we are on the second layer. The first layer concerns consciousness about our five senses in addition to bodily sensations. Ontogenetically, therefore, the first observation must be about non-mental contents.

This understanding of inductive reasoning may not be that non-traditional. However, we also see observations as explanations. This allows us to equal observations and explanations so that we can build higher level theories and explanations. The ontogenetically very first observation, however, is unconventional since it (also) is an explanation. So, there are now two gaps. The first one is the ordinary gap between neurological activity and the conscious contents. The other gap is between a conscious contents and the awareness of it.

The template poses two problems for the possibility of machines’ inductive learning given that inductive reasoning and learning both are founded upon observations.

We can exemplify the template by considering two adjoined cases. First we have the biological organism. Think of a cow’s newborn calf that can walk. Now think of a student studying in a different culture and that learns the social codes by experience. We can now join the cases into a human infant.

Think of an infant turning for the first time without knowing how to turn. Now think of the same infant later in its development doing the same move but now after an intention to turn. In the first case the infant evidently has learned to turn but without learning it via observations. In the second case the infant has observed its movements and has tried to repeat them (or at least to turn). In the second case, therefore, the infant has used inductive learning.

Conclusions. The first issue concerning machine learning is if machines experience anything. If we look at a robot vacuum cleaner there is no doubt that it can adapt to the environment. If that is learning machines can learn. Here we can see the first issue as a matter of convention. The other issue, however, cannot be solved in this way. If inductive learning takes observations and observations are about mental contents, then “agents” without mental contents cannot observe and therefore neither learn inductively.

Keywords

Observations as explanations

Observations are about mental contents

Machine learning

Dagens psykiatri befinner sig i ett etiskt sönderfall

Jag är sextio år och det kan tyckas att sextiotalisten varnar för ungdomens förfall men jag ska tala för min sak utifrån ett fallexempel och några artiklar.

Jag började arbeta som psykolog på Brandbergens vårdcentral i Haninge söder om Stockholm 2003. Det första decenniet arbetade jag ensam så det blev en vana att ta emot så många studenter som möjligt. Nu är vi många psykologer och traditionen lever vidare.

Det senaste decenniet har jag själv varit patient. Jag har hjärncancer och har gjort fyra operationer. Efter de två första kom jag tillbaka genom arbetsrehabilitering. Jag hade fördjupat mig i mindfulness och kunde arbeta upp kapacitet med detta. Den fjärde operationen gjorde jag under pågående heltidssjukskrivning efter den tredje operationen. Den långsamtväxande cancerformen hade övergått till att bli snabbväxande.

Jag tog mig dock tillbaka och har jobbat i ett år. Dock utan att få patienter för mindfulness. Parallellt har kollegorna planerat för en stresskola. I juni fick jag reda på att jag skulle kalla alla som visat intresse för stresskolan till mindfulnessgrupp efter semestern. Jag skulle också ta hälften av alla nybesök vuxna.

Jag blev naturligtvis paff men den krassa förklaringen är att subjektet (i det här fallet mitt subjekt) inte är med som parameter.

Jag kraschade tungt direkt efter semestern. Svårigheterna med att involvera subjektet inom vården är dock större än vad detta fallexempel kan visa.

”Att veta är att mäta”, är det som gäller. Om man inte kan mäta subjektet finns det inte. Filosofin har brottats med detta sedan de gamla grekerna. Nu tar man för givet att allt är mätbart. För att klara den spärren har jag behövt bryta ny filosofisk mark (2017). För att begreppsliga relationen mellan det biologiska objektet och det upplevande subjektet behövde jag sedan definiera en icke-kemisk biologisk energi (2021). Slutligen, för att få in det upplevande subjektet som en klinisk parameter, behövde jag skapa en ny psykologi, makropsykologi (2024).

Nu finns det en väg att följa för att återinföra det upplevande subjektet.

För att kunna arbeta etisk i förhållande till det upplevande subjektet behöver det erkännas. Nu är det möjligt.

Det etiska sönderfallet inom psykiatrin är en följd av tidsandan. Det upplevande subjektet erkänns inte eftersom det inte går att mäta. Det etiska förhållningssättet till det upplevande subjektet har därför imploderat. Lösningen till detta omänskliga förhållande är att följa min väg. Kunskap är kanske makt men just nu är det framförallt ansvar. Vi kan förhålla oss etiskt till det upplevande subjektet. Följ bara min väg.

Referenser

Gamper, J. (2017). On a Loophole in Causal Closure. Philosophia 45, 631–636https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9791-y

Gamper, J. (2021). Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject. Axiomathes 31, 497–506. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09494-8

Gamper, J. (2024). Marco psychology.

https://www.qeios.com/read/QTI0VB

Abstract

This dialogue turns into a discussion between three people. The interlocutors are Socrates, Jeito and finally also Plato. The dimensions of Time, Space and Person are occasionally transgressed. The conclusion is that information seems to be unidirectional concerning life and death.

Jeito. I have been waiting a long time to meet you. Finally. How are you?

Socrates. I don’t know. Should I?

Jeito. Sorry. You hear me. Do you see me?

Socrates. I don’t think so. Who are you?

Jeito. Sorry. I’m Jeito. You’re Socrates.

Socrates. Yes. But could you please answer my question?

Jeito. I’m searching for wisdom. I have been learning about myself for over thirty years.

Socrates. That’s good. What have you learned?

Jeito. That it’s worse than I thought. And better.

Socrates. I like that. How can you be alive? Don’t they kill you for wisdom where you come from?

Jeito. …

Socrates. Okay. What more?

Jeito. Now it’s your turn. Please.

Socrates. I love my wife. She’s dead now. You cannot satisfy the gods. What more? You can discuss after death. Obviously. Friendship is important. You can see further than you think. What more? Knowledge starts with knowing yourself. Plato didn’t believe me. I don’t know. Can you continue?

Jeito. We’re all one.

Socrates. You learned that from inspection?

Jeito. No. I was told that.

Socrates. Thought so. What else?

Jeito. No man is an island.

Socrates. Come on now!

Jeito. I project my own shit on others.

Socrates. That’s better. More?

Jeito. I’m angry as hell.

Socrates. More?

Jeito. What do you care?

Socrates. Fair point. But tell me.

Jeito. I’m here talking to you. That’s a miracle!

Socrates. Really? It’s just how things are. You see it yourself. Through yourself. By looking at yourself. The question is what we learn from it. The learning is the miracle. Have you learned anything?

Jeito. That we are allowed to learn?

That’s a fact. What do you learn from it?

Jeito. We are free?

Socrates. That is also a fact. What do you learn from it?

Jeito. I get a bit scared.

Socrates. That’s a fact. What do you learn from it?

Jeito. That freedom is scary. You have said that, haven’t you?

Socrates. I can’t remember everything I’ve said. What are you doing here?

Jeito. I don’t remember.

Socrates. I think you just now used your freedom. Was it scary?

Jeito. No. Can I ask you something else?

Socrates. By all means. Welcome to ask whatever you want.

Jeito. Okay. Thanks. Do you think you can find all knowledge inside yourself?

Socrates. Why not?

Jeito. Can I find all knowledge inside myself?

Socrates. That’s the same question.

Jeito. All men can find all knowledge inside themselves?

Socrates. All humans can do it. Given reasonable circumstances. Do you disagree?

Jeito. No. I think I understand your point. Is there a certain age we are talking about?

Socrates. You make me laugh. I’m actually angry. Really nice feeling. Please, ask something.

Jeito. Are we in God now?

Socrates. Who?

Jeito. Are we in God now?

Socrates. Which one?

Jeito. There are more than one God?

Socrates. Are there any?

Jeito. Where are we, do you think?

Socrates. How do you define any God?

Jeito. Fair question. Can you help me?

Socrates. We’re all alone. Won’t you say?

Jeito. So. We all have the same God or there is no God?

Socrates. Is there a God?

Jeito. Can we ask someone else?

Socrates. We could try. I don’t know how, though.

Jeito. Hello! Is there anybody out there? Hello! Is there anybody in here?

Plato. You threw away all my books!

Jeito. I did. I needed to.

Socrates. Hey there, my old friend. How are you?

Plato. Am I invited? To what? By whom? What is this? How do I know that that man had thrown away my books? I’m fine, thanks? How are you?

Socrates. It’s all a blur. We where trying to clear these things out when you answered our prayers. We need help. I’ll try to find a suitable question. …. What do you experience, Plato?

Plato. Friendship.

Socrates. Jeito?

Jeito. Anxiety.

Socrates. Okay. I experience a feeling of responsibility. So. What do we learn from this? …. What do we know considering this? Anything?

Jeito. We are somewhere. We have contact.

Socrates. What is contact?

Plato. Our words matters. They are meaningful. We affect one another.

Socrates. What do we learn from that?

Plato. We are not the same. We’re individuals.

Jeito. We’re subjects?

Plato. Yes. We’re different but connected.

Socrates. So. We have learned that our experiences tell us that we are separate and connected. And that we are somewhere. And the specific experiences are feelings of anxiety, friendship and responsibility?

Jeito. Yes.

Plato. Yes. So. Where are we? And why? How did we come here?

Socrates. Is it okay that I take the lead here? I’m still feeling responsible.

Plato. Please.

Jeito. Yes. That’s fine with me.

Socrates. Plato. Do you see anything?

Plato. Can’t say I do. I have images. But I cannot say I see anything. Hard to explain.

Socrates. Yes. Let’s carry on. …. What does it matter where, why, how? Anyone?

Plato. Yes. Would it change anything? Probably not. It is how it is. What is this language, by the way?

Jeito. It’s some kind of language but we don’t talk it. We communicate in some way but not as in “talking” talking. Do we even have mouths? Or ears? Or hands? For me the language is English. What about you, Socrates?

Socrates. It’s a blur. But the actual language. Is it even me talking. I don’t know. How is it for you, Plato?

Plato. I suddenly remember things. The clothing people had. Smells. Fresh air coming in from the sea. Grapes. Walks. My hand gesturing. I do communicate these things now. But how, I don’t know. I don’t think I like these questions. But I like you two. We’re almost a crowd. Aren’t we?

Socrates. If we go. Where do we go? If I go. Where do I go? Can I go? Anywhere? It doesn’t feel like it. How free am I? How free are we? It’s like exploring a cave that you cannot escape?

Plato. Responsibility? Someone? Where is the “panic button”? I’d like that sea breeze.

Jeito. ….

Plato. ….

Socrates. …. I’m not so sure now. Give me a minute. …. Everyone is gone?

Plato. Excuse me?

Socrates. Okay. That was funny. On me. …. We are here. Some others may be somewhere else. …. I’m thinking of gods. Are we back where it all started? Will it start all over again? … I seem to have difficulties finding the right question or the right questions.

Jeito. Okay. Could we try shifting focus? A difference between you two and me is that I haven’t, to my knowledge, died yet. Perhaps this is the chance to tell the people something about the afterlife?

Plato. Nice try! Haven’t we concluded that we don’t know shit? What’s to tell? That you met two dead guys that couldn’t tell you nothing.

Socrates. Give me a moment! Okay? …. Perhaps you are not dead but what guarantees that you will be able to go back? Your life isn’t here? Am I right?

Jeito. Busted! Kidding. I hear my cat doing her thing behind me. I’m alive. But then again I don’t know about the afterlife. It’s up to you guys.

Socrates. Do I remember anything about it? How could I? Sorry. When you’re dead you are dead. I don’t know about this state.

Plato. Agree. But Jeito, surely you are almost dead? Otherwise, how could we have this nice talk?

Socrates. Isn’t it either or? Jeito cannot be both. And we cannot go back?

Plato. I would say that he is dead. He’s exactly like us. Or?

Socrates. Who could tell?

Jeito. Let’s spin this around. I’ll go back to the cat and check whether I still can have connection with you two. Are you with me?

Socrates. Whatever.

Plato. I know you are after me. Don’t try to trick me! I’ll haunt you.

Jeito. See you soon.

…

Socrates. What have you learned?

Plato. Thank you.

Jeito. I think, that we are all the same but different.

This is my rejected master thesis in philosophy from Stockholm university. Interested parties may claim it as compensation for degrees.

Johan Gamper. (2024). Causal Principles in Material Constitution: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Composition of Objects. Qeios. doi:10.32388/H2B7NA.2.

Abstract

This manuscript delves into the philosophical debate surrounding the Special Composition Question (SCQ), focusing on the causal relationships between objects and their constituent parts. By distinguishing between Weak and Strong Causal Composition, the article explores how causal mechanisms underpin the composition of objects. Theories from notable philosophers, including van Inwagen and Leibniz, are evaluated. This study seeks to bridge the gap between common sense perspectives and principled ontological theories by introducing the concepts of Weak and Strong Causal Composition. The analysis reveals how a causal approach can offer insightful resolutions to longstanding debates in mereology and ontology, emphasizing the role of causality in understanding the essence of material composition. The proposed causal perspective encourages further philosophical inquiry into the foundational principles governing the composition of objects.