I am a bit tired of the implicit demand of references when writing a philosophy article. References are almost always needed. But just almost. Sometimes they are not needed. Sometimes they are obscuring the view. So if I add them what I am trying to convey is at risk of being missed. Sometimes that blocks the development of human thought. One such thing relates to the contemporary monistic view that everything is physical. Everything may be physical but it is very hard for not to say impossible to show. The alternative is to just claim it which of course is allowed.
So why is it so hard to show that everything is physical? If we say that it is evident that there are physical things, why cannot there be other stuff? For example mental things? The standard argument has to do with the relation between physical things and, in this case mental things. The argument builds on the idea that there cannot be a relation between physical things and other things. Since there seems to be relations between physical things and other things, those things must be physical. In this case mental things must be physical things.
A difficulty relates to the problem that one also easily can claim that it is evident that there are mental things. If there cannot be a relation between mental things and other things even though it seems like it, those other things must be mental?
Since this, philosophically, is a valid turn, we cannot prove that everything is physical by claiming it is evident that there are physical things.
Regarding this note references would block the argument since references are part of the contemporary monistic view that everything is physical.
Johan Gamper
