Talking about intuitions in relation to analytic philosophy is to step out of the very analytic setting since the intuitions per definition cannot be given analytic evidence for. They are to be compared to basic assumptions in any rigorous explanatory system.
Proper intuitions/basic assumptions, also, are explanatory black holes; there is no possibility to see beyond them.
This may seem limiting but on the one side it is necessary to draw conclusions from something rather than from nothing and on the other side we can always attempt grounding an intuition/basic assumption in some other intuition/basic assumption, and thereby give the original intuition/basic assumption analytic status.
Now, from the other end we must consider it necessary to validate our intuitions/basic assumptions and their implications in observations.
Let us differentiate between an observation and a sensory impression. An example would be that I may see an apple but I only observe the apple if I know that I see it.
We can now define knowledge as explanations of observations.
A consistent system of explanations would comprise a theory.
Finally we can label an unexplained theory a science.
Incommensurable sciences, again, would be parallel sciences (perhaps astronomy and astrology is an example).
We can now decide to widen the scope and let theories be observations and let observations be explanations. A theory, therefore, that is unexplained, is both a science and an observation.
The raw data, thus, for inductive reasoning, would be explanations of sensory impressions (or, equivalently, observations of sensory impressions).
Note that this implicates that the very first observation cannot be accounted for inductively.
Also, neither detection of the sensory stimulus nor having the very sensory impression suffice for inductive reasoning. It requires reflexive knowing that you have the sensory impression.
A cat’s trial-and-error-opening-a-door may therefore not give it inductive knowledge.
Inductive knowledge – the basis of empirical science – therefore must be grounded in intuitions/basic assumptions – hypothetical-deductive science. A purely empirical science, in other words, is an illusion. The idea to be inspired by the natural sciences regarding analytic philosophy is simply a mistake.
To rely only on intuitions/basic assumptions, however, is futile.
Epistemologically, therefore, analytic philosophy and empirical science have both an autonomous relation and a symbiotic relation.
Keywords
Analytic philosophy, empirical science, hypothetical-deductive science
