Adalja

Abstract

We see two papers in juxtaposition and ask if they add up to something more.

In my old manuscript “Formal Theology”(2023a) that now is out as a preprint I show that science and theology can be founded upon the same set of basic assumptions. Can Formal Theology also be used to ground a religion? “Religion“, in this regard, as related to beliefs. Well, of course, that depends. A positive argument is the claimed revelation “Led 4 (us), (Gamper 2023b). I had this revelation in December 2022. A typical Abrahamic prophet confirms the basic assumption in Formal Theology. I don’t feel especially Abrahamic and do believe that the basic assumption in Formal Theology can ground any religion’s concept of a First Cause, seen through the glasses of modern science. There is no contradiction.

References

Johan Gamper. (2023a). Formal Theology. Qeios. doi:10.32388/EMANIB.

(Also on philpapers [https://philpapers.org/rec/GAMFTK])

Johan Gamper. (2023b). Led 4 (us) — A dialogue about faith and knowledge. Qeios. doi:10.32388/63N2I4.

Gamper, J. Scientific Ontology. Axiomathes 29, 99–102 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9396-0

Abstract

The modal properties of the principle of the causal closure of the physical have traditionally been said to prevent anything outside the physical world from affecting the physical universe and vice versa. This idea has been shown to be relative to the definition of the principle (Gamper in Philosophia 45:631–636, 2017). A traditional definition prevents the one universe from affecting any other universe, but with a modified definition, e.g. (ibid.), the causal closure of the physical can be consistent with the possibility of one universe affecting the other universe. Gamper (2017) proved this modal property by implementing interfaces between universes. Interfaces are thus possible, but are they realistic? To answer this question, I propose a two-step process where the second step is scientific research. The first step, however, is to fill the gap between the principles or basic assumptions and science with a consistent theoretical framework that accommodates the modal properties of an ontology that matches the basic assumptions.

Keywords

• Scientific ontology
• Modality
• Philosophy of physics
• Philosophy of mind
• Dualism
• Causal closure
• Loophole causal closure

Gamper (2021) applied on biological systems. Note the difference as compared to the point of fracture in the stress-strain curve in material science (see, for instance, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stress%E2%80%93strain_curve).

Reference

Gamper, J. (2021). Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject. Axiomathes 31, 497–506. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09494-8

For those interested in the philosophy of biology I want to push for three papers of mine (2021, 2023, 2024) that go a far distance from mainstream philosophy of biology.

The first one focuses the relationship between biological objects and experiencing subjects. The other one focuses the relation between the biological object and consciousness in a formal setting. The third one focuses the biological simple in relation to, for instance, the physical simple.

References

Gamper, J. Biological Energy and the Experiencing Subject. Axiomathes 31, 497–506 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09494-8

Johan Gamper. (2023). Formal Theology. Qeios. doi:10.32388/EMANIB. [section 4.2.1]

Johan Gamper. (2024). Causal Principles in Material Constitution: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Composition of Objects. Qeios. doi:10.32388/H2B7NA.2.

Johan Gamper, psychologist, philosopher

Independent researcher

The second philosophy concerns being as being if some things may be composed of things of more than one ontological kind (Gamper 2023 a&b)

References

(2023a). Mileva — a Dialogue About General Relativity as Regional. Qeios. doi:10.32388/6I9WNV.

(2023b). Formal Theology. Qeios. doi:10.32388/EMANIB.

Johan Gamper

Michael Cain’s character Professor John Brand in the movie Interstellar has a Plan A for the survival of mankind. If that doesn’t work he has a backup Plan B. Plan A is the wanted one whereas Plan B saves some astronauts and a lot of fertilized eggs.

Today we have a scientific culture that functions as our Plan A. That culture states that everything in one way or the other is physical. A recent shift in our language is the move from “my thoughts are in my mind” to “my thoughts are in my brain”. If we have thoughts and everything in the end is physical it is natural to think that one’s thoughts are in one’s brain.

In preparation for the defense of my master thesis in theoretical philosophy at Stockholm University, Sweden (2019 [revised version adapted for peer review], 2024 [original manuscript with an updated title, originally it was entitled “Causal Composition”]) I played with an application of it and found that it provided an ontologically neutral view of the scientific object. I had introduced the concept of causal objects and it applied for any kind of object (with a causal background). In my preparation I saw that separate ontological fields could be joined by something I called interfaces (2017 [the preparation never came to be used since the defense seminar was canceled]). Accordingly, everything in the end may be physical – or not. I thought this eventuality was very interesting.

Plan B is to investigate this possibility and see where it may lead. One thing is established, though, and that is that the mind can be a substance of its own ― provided that there can be interfaces between ontological domains.

Variation 1

Descartes’ extended objects are not just extended. They are, just like all other ordinary objects, also continuous objects. Take a football for instance. It rolls over the football field when you kick it. It rolls and is itself as it rolls. Just like people going about doing their things being themselves as they go about. Any causes affecting such a continuous object affect the continuous object. It is like the famous example with billiards balls. The balls go there and there after the break – as continuous objects.

When we look at quantum sized objects we have the same basic understanding of them. They move about as continuous objects and are extended. The dualistic view of the mind, however, is that the mind is something totally different. For one thing, it has no physical extension. And, of course, this disqualifies it from the list of possible objects.

When we move with plan A, therefore, we think that all things are continuous and that they belong to a specific set of dimensions, the physical dimensions. In a variation of this theme we must change something. We have three things to look at: the dimensionality, the continuity, and the extension of the object.

We can start with the extension of the object. Physical objects have extension. They have physical extension. If we in this variation assume non-physical objects to be without extension we are back in the Princess Elisabeth-Descartes dilemma. So let us say that all objects have extension. Given this, that all objects have extension, we can add the assumption that all objects are in some set of dimensions. They have some sort of dimensionality.

Now we have continuity left to consider. Without attacking footballs or creatures moving about let us just take a deep breath and pause with continuity for a while.

In the preparation to defend my master thesis I saw that separate ontological fields could be joined by interfaces ― provided that all objects were causal objects. Essentially this is the variation since causal objects are discrete objects.

References

Gamper, J. (2017). On a Loophole in Causal Closure. Philosophia 45, 631–636.

Gamper, J. (2019). Blocking the Vagueness Block – A New Restricted Answer to the Special Composition Question. Philosophia 47, 425–428. Full text via ResearchGate.

Gamper, J. (2024). Causal Principles in Material Constitution: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Composition of Objects. Qeios. doi:10.32388/H2B7NA.2.

Johan Gamper. (2023). On the Axiomatisation of the Natural Laws — A Compilation of Human Mistakes Intended to Be Understood Only By Robots. Qeios. doi:10.32388/KC9YAU.

Abstract

This is an attempt to axiomatise the natural laws. Note especially axiom 4, which is expressed in third order predicate logic, and which permits a solution to the problem of causation in nature without stating that “everything has a cause”. The undefined term “difference” constitutes the basic element and each difference is postulated to have an exact position and to have a discrete cause. The set of causes belonging to a natural set of dimensions is defined as a law. This means that a natural law is determined by the discrete causes tied to a natural set of dimensions. A law is defined as “defined” in a point if a difference there has a cause. Given that there is a point for which the law is not defined it is shown that a difference is caused that connects two points in two separate sets of dimensions.

Keywords: Natural laws, Axiomatisation, Causality, Objects

1. Undefined terms

1. ρ

2. σ

3. Difference

4. Dimension

5. Relation

6. Element

7. Cause

8. Point

9. Belongs to

10.Existence

2. Initial definitions

a set = df A specific existence of elements (in this extraction defined by occurrence within brackets ({})).

a complex of dimensions = a field of dimensions = df A set of dimensions.

D = df A specific and limited set of dimensions.

π = df The cause of ρ on σ.

θ = {σ, ρ, π} = df

1. A specific π that causes a specific ρ on a specific σ,

2. the specific ρ that is caused by the specific π in 1. and

3. the specific σ mentioned in 1.

Dkm = df A specific and limited field of dimensions; {dk, dk+1, …, dm}, in which d is a separate dimension and Dkm contains m-k+1 dimensions.

form = df A specific set of relations.

Ξ = df The form of θ.

elements of relation = df Parts of a structure of relations necessary to define a form.

Π, Ρ and Σ = df The elements of relation of Ξ; where Π represents the relations of π, Ρ the relations of ρ and Σ the relations of σ.

3. Axioms

Axiom 1: ρ is a difference

Axiom 2: σ is a difference

Axiom 3: ρ belongs to Dkm, a specific and limited field of dimensions

Axiom 4: In all points X belonging to an arbitrary D, Ξ is true.

4. The object Ω

Ω = df

1. {ρ1, ρ2, …, ρi},

2. in which each and every ρx (1 ≤ x ≤ i) constitutes a difference towards {ρ1, ρ2, …, ρx-1}, and where

3. ρx+1 constitutes a difference towards {ρ1, ρ2, …, ρx-1, ρx}.

5. π:s relation to D

θ implicates an unique cause π to each and every ρ. For a specific and limited field of dimensions Dkm therefore, a precise set of causes λ is tied to included ρ. This specific set causes the total set of ρ in Dkm. Each and every ρ in Dkm therefore can be explained with the set λ. Why ρx+1, for instance, is answered with πx.

Definition of the law λ

λ = df {π0, π1, …, πq}, in which each and every πx causes a ρx+1 belonging to the set {ρ1, ρ2, …,ρq,ρq+1} which constitutes the total amount ρ in a specific and limited field of dimensions (Dkm).

From the definition above follows theorem 5 and theorem 6.

Theorem 1: (Not part of this compilation.)

Theorem 2: (Not part of this compilation.)

Theorem 3: (Not part of this compilation.)

Theorem 4: (Not part of this compilation.)

Theorem 5: λkm causes all ρ in Dkm.

Theorem 6: Every ρ caused by a certain law λx exists in a limited and specific complex of dimensions Dx.

6. Inter-relations of laws λ

Definition of Dn

Dn = df The field of dimensions {d1, d2, …, df, …, dg, …, dn-1, dn},1≤f ≤g≤n that contains;

1. all ρx belonging to Dfg,

2. all ρy that can form Ω for ρx and

3. all ρz that ρx can constitute Ω for.

Definition of Λ of Dn

Λ = df {λ1, λ2, …, λP}, where Ρ is the total amount of laws applying in Dn and where {λ1, λ2, …, λP} causes all ρ belonging to Dn.

Another definition concludes this section:

initiating difference = df σ

7. Definition of “λ defined in a point X0”

With Λ and its part-laws λ each and every difference related to Ω (ρ) has a cause π belonging to Λ. Assume a point X0 belonging to Dkm belonging to Dn. What “λkm is defined in X0“ means is defined below.

Definition of λ defined

λkm is defined in a point X0 belonging to Dkm = df θ is true in X0.

Theorem 7: If λkm is defined in X0, Λ is defined in X0

Theorem 8: If Λ is defined in X0, λkm is defined in X0

A special case is at hand when for a point X0 holds {¬σ, ¬ρ, ¬π}. Is in this case λkm defined in X0? Since λkm does not exist in X0 (¬π is true and π is λ:s representative in X0), λkm is neither defined nor not defined in X0. Thus the next theorem applies:

Theorem 9: If for a point X0 holds {¬σ, ¬ρ, ¬π} λkm for the point is neither defined nor not defined.

Before going further some new concepts are introduced:

effect = df ρ

a point of effect = df A point X in which ρ is true.

From the two definitions above follows:

Theorem 10: In a point of effect θ is true.

8. Beyond θ

Either the state of things is such that it is not possible that θ does not apply in each point where π apply, or it is not impossible. If the latter is the case something not of Λ bound can emerge in a point. Arbitrariness though, in that case, is not imminent, nor chance, due to axiom 4: “In all points X belonging to an arbitrary D, Ξ is true” (Ξ = df The form of θ). This implies that if a law for a point is defined in that point Ξapply and if the law is not defined Ξapply:

Theorem 11: Ξ is true in all points X0 whether or not λ(X0) is defined.

Ξ,”the form of θ”, does not include chance because the form implicates a cause to each difference. Therefore the following is valid:

Theorem 12: It is not true for any point that effect can occur by chance.

9. Derivation and definition of ρ’ and ~ρ

Λ not defined in X0

Assume Λ is not defined in a pointX0. This implicates according to the definition of ”λ defined” that θ is not true in X0. For X0 then the following is true:

(1) ¬θ

θ has three elements for which thus apply “not”:

(2) ¬{σ, ρ, π}

(2) implicates that at least one element of θ is negated:

Theorem 13: ¬θ ⇒ i) {¬σ, ρ, π}∨ ii) {σ, ¬ρ, π}∨ iii) {σ, ρ, ¬π}∨ iv) {¬σ, ¬ρ, π} ∨ v) {¬σ, ρ, ¬π}∨ vi) {σ, ¬ρ, ¬π} ∨ vii) {¬σ, ¬ρ, ¬π}

According to theorem 9 Λ is neither defined nor not defined in a point X0 where vii) is true, therefore vii) is not true in X0.

Again ¬π implicates a cause-less difference [iii) and v)] and also a cause-less negation of difference [vi)]. Furthermore ¬σ implicates that a cause of a difference has emerged at random [i)] respectively a cause of a negated difference emerging at random [iv)]. When a cause-less difference or negation of difference is equal to chance i), iii)-vi) implicates chance. Since axiom 4, by theorem 12, does not permit chance i), iii)-vi) are not true in X0. ¬ρ finally implicates negation of difference [ii)].

¬θ then implicates seven alternatives of which six are not possible. Then the seventh, ii) {σ, ¬ρ, π}, is true:

Theorem 14: If Λ is not defined in a point X0 {σ, ¬ρ, π} is true in that point.

10. Of Ρ in X0 where Λ is not defined

Theorem 14, though, does not show how Ξ:s elements of relation are fulfilled when it is lacking a fulfilment of Ρ. Axiom 4 implicates that Ρ is fulfilled in X0. Thus Ρ is fulfilled in X0.

Theorem 15: If Λ is not defined in a point X0 then holds for X0: {σ, ¬ρ, π} ∧ Ρ is fulfilled.

Ρ is not fulfilled by the ρ that is negated (ρ), nor by the negation of it (¬ρ). That which fulfils Ρ in X0 can be called ρ’.

Definition of ρ‘: ρ‘ = df That which fulfils Ρ in a point X0 for which Λ is not defined.

11. Dimensionality

In X0 ¬ρ is true. Since X0∈Dn ρ’ can not belong to Dn, nor is it possible that the point which ρ’ belongs to, belongs to Dn.

Theorem 16: The point that ρ‘ belongs to, does not belong to Dn.

Definition of X’0 = df The point that ρ‘ belongs to.

Here a hypothesis will be introduced, in which it is assumed that ρ’ exists in the dimensions Dn symbolises with the addition of some more, separating it from Dn:

Hypothesis 1: ρ‘ exists in a complex of dimensions with the n dimensions of Dn plus ω numbers of dimensions, ω∈N, ω>0.

Definition of D’: D’ = df The complex of dimensions that ρ‘ belongs to.

Theorem 17: Dn ∈ D’.

12. New laws

Λ does not apply in X0. In spite of that ρ’ is caused for X0 (in X’0). With this, one could say that Λ’ determines ρ’. The specific law that applies in X0′ can be called λ’1. Also π did not cause ρ’. The cause of ρ’ can be called π’.

Definition of π’: π‘ = df The cause of ρ’.

Definition of λ‘1: λ‘1 = df The law that the cause of ρ‘ belongs to.

Definition of Λ‘: Λ‘ = df The law-domain that contains λ‘1.

13. The cause of ρ’

Since ρ’ does not belong to Dn it cannot exist in X0. Therefore there are two points to be considered though they are connected. For the pair of points X0-X0′ holds:

#1 {σ, ¬ρ, ρ’, π}

σ and π on the other hand cannot belong to X’0, since they belong to Dn.

In X’0 there is ρ’. According to axiom 4 in X0′ there also has to be more elements. Axiom 4 states that the cause and condition of effect have to be found in the point of effect. Therefore cause and condition of effect is part of #1. Since only ¬ρ is not occupied as an element of relation it has the quality of the two missing elements of X0′. Thus ¬ρ is part of X0′. For not violating logical rules of dimensions, namely that what is part of Dn cannot be identical to that which is part of D’ ≠ Dn, ¬ρ in Dn is not identical to that of D’. ¬ρ in X0′ can be called ~ρ (“denied” ρ).

14. ~ρ as a set

Because π’ and ~ρ are elements, not for instance numbers, the relation between the two can be formulated as a relation between sets. Then the one is an element of the other. Since π’ definitely is one:

Definition of ~ρ: ~ρ = df The representation of ¬ρ in X’0

Theorem 18: In X’0 ~ρ is cause and condition of ρ‘.

Theorem 19: (Not part of this compilation).

Theorem 20: σ‘ ∈ ~ρ

Theorem 21 : π‘ ∈ ~ρ

Definition of σ‘: σ‘ = df What fulfils the relations of Σ in X’0

Therefore:

X0: {σ, ¬ρ, π}

X’0: {σ’, ρ’, π’}

Theorem 22: (Not part of this compilation.)

Theorem 23: (Not part of this compilation.)

Theorem 24: (Not part of this compilation.)

Theorem 25: (Not part of this compilation.)

Theorem 26: (Not part of this compilation.)

Theorem 27: (Not part of this compilation.)

Finally a theorem that sums up some aspects of the theory so far:

Theorem 28: If Λ is not defined in a point X0 {σ, ~ρ, ρ‘, π} is true.

15. The concept Θ

If Λ is not defined in a point X0 belonging to Dn, ΡforX0 is shifted to D’, a complex of dimensions separated from Dn. Ρ in D’ is called ρ’. This implicates an existence of something with association to ¬ρ, ~ρ. The cause of ρ’, π’, in turn, belongs to ~ρ.

For X0-X’0 holds according to theorem 28: {σ, ~ρ, ρ’, π}. In a point X’1, separated from X’0, and belonging to D’, the case is: {σ, π, ρ}, that is, θ. Between Dn and D’ {σ, ~ρ, ρ’, π} is true, a state of facts below symbolised Θ.

Definition of Θ: Θ = df {σ, ~ρ, ρ’, π} .

That Θ can be true is the result of the present study.

Theorem 29: (Not part of this compilation.)

Theorem 30: (Not part of this compilation.)

Theorem 31: (Not part of this compilation.)

16. Axiom(s) of existence

Axiom of existence 1: There is at least one point for which Θ is true.

17. Conclusion

Given this extraction something exists in two separate sets of dimensions. Extrapolating this finding we have a new perspective on quantum entanglement (Bub 2020). If a set of quantum particles pair wise are joined by what has been labelled “Θ:s” they would be entangled. It would also be interesting to investigate “interfaces” between separate sets of things (Gamper 2017) using the concept of “Θ“.

References

Bub, Jeffrey, “Quantum Entanglement and Information”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/qt-entangle/>

Gamper, J. On a Loophole in Causal Closure. Philosophia 45, 631–636 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9791-y