Metaphysics uniting theology and science — back to the basics (as in back to the basic assumptions). Gamper (forthcoming)

Abstract

I have had the fortune to find a way to unite theology and science. It is and has been a bit overwhelming. My aim was to integrate science and hermeneutics but I ended up with a theory that integrates pretty much everything. In this paper I focus the fundamental principle that seems so simple that it could taken for a tautology but it is not. The principle, or, rather, the basic assumption, is that an ontologically homogeneous domain does not cause an ontologically homogeneous domain. By this device all ontologically homogeneous domains are causally closed in relation to other ontologically homogeneous domains. Ontologically heterogeneous domains, on the other hand, are permitted to cause and to be caused by ontologically homogeneous domains. The very first ontologically homogeneous domain, also, is permitted to be caused by an ontologically heterogeneous domain. Science, therefore, would concern inquiries into all ontologically homogeneous and heterogeneous domains except for the first ontologically heterogeneous domain. The first ontologically heterogeneous domain would be the field of interest for theology. Consecutive ontologically homogeneous domains could be the platonic mathematical universe, the physical universe and ourselves as subjects.

Universes and interfaces

Friends, it is time to reconcile science with theology. Science builds upon the basic assumption that the physical is causally unaffected by anything non-physical. That leaves science detached from theology. If we instead see the physical for what it is, an ontologically homogeneous domain, we can let science be based upon the basic assumption that an ontologically homogeneous domain does not cause an ontologically homogeneous domain. By that we let science leave the door open for ontologically heterogeneous domains. Heterogeneous domains consist of more than one ontological kind whereas homogeneous domains consist of only one ontological kind. We call ontologically homogeneous domains universes and ontologically heterogeneous domains interfaces. The physical, thus, is a universe. Based on the basic assumption that universes do not cause universes it is allowed that interfaces both can be caused by and cause universes. The physical universe, therefore, can be caused by an interface.

Vertical interfaces

If we let interfaces that cause universes be called vertical interfaces the very first universe would be caused by a vertical interface. As the first cause, therefore, God is a vertical interface, a realm with more than one ontological kind.

Horizontal interfaces

We can also look at the event that there are interfaces that do not cause universes. We call such interfaces horizontal interfaces. A specific kind of horizontal interfaces are horizontal interfaces that are caused by universes. This kind is of foremost interest for science. The combination of vertical and horizontal interfaces opens up for causal interactions between universes. The basic assumption that universes do not cause universes forbids direct causal interactions between universes but with help of vertical and horizontal interfaces there is room for indirect causal interactions. We have two immediate applications of this option. For science this is a door to a new scientific revolution.

Black holes and the original singularity

The platonic mathematical universe can be viewed as a homogeneous domain. If we take it that the mathematical universe can produce a mathematical singularity that turns into an interface that singularity can be viewed as the original singularity behind the Big Bang. That singularity, then, would be the cause of the physical universe, a vertical interface. In the next step we know that the physical universe can produce black holes as consequences of gravitational collapses, that is, singularities. We can assume that those singularities — the black hole singularities — are horizontal interfaces not causing any universes.

Consciousness and self-consciousness

We can now turn to biology and the rise of consciousness. A neglected part in the philosophy of mind is the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. If I see you I may be aware of it. The question is if I must be able to be aware of my seeing you to be able to see you? If that is the case only those with the capacity for self-consciousness can see or hear things. That is an option. The other option is that for instance cats can see me but that they do not have the capacity to know that they see me. In the latter case we can proceed to something substantial. In that case the very being able to see, or to be able to be conscious of something, is the first mystery, the first thing to account for in the philosophy of mind. I suspect that this very consciousness is the vertical interface causing the mind, or our subject. The next thing to account for is the subject being able to be conscious of its very consciousness— the self-consciousness. I suspect that the self-consciousness is a horizontal interface.

Extended interfaces

I will now close the circle. Say that there are yet more kinds of interfaces. One possibility is that the first cause is part of horizontal interfaces. A horizontal interface, then, without the first cause, would be a horizontal interface. A horizontal interface with the first cause, on the other side, would be an extended interface. Two options are that the first cause is part of black hole singularities and/or is part of our self-consciousness. With these options God also would be horizontal interfaces.

Reconciling science with theology

We can now reconcile science with theology if science can acknowledge that it concerns one or more ontological domain and if theology can be said to concern an existence that concerns more than one ontological domain. Via the concept of interfaces science can no longer claim the non-existence of God as the first cause. God as the first cause is an open question for science. With the introduction of the concept of a mathematical-physical ontologically heterogeneous domain, however, the burden of proof is now on the scientific side. If there is one interface there is an enormous push for God as the first cause. Science now has to prove that black hole singularities are not interfaces to secure the claim of physicalism. Another difficulty for science is the explanation of the mind-body relation. Without interfaces there is still no account for the relation. Traditional science, therefore, is inclined to explain the very mind away.

Gamper, Johan, Metaphysics uniting theology and science — back to the basics (as in back to the basic assumptions), in Metaphysics 2021. Proceedings of the Eight World Conference on Metaphysics 2021, 27-29 de octubre de 2021, FISER, FFR, UTPL